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Although research on action processing indicates people segment action
according to a partonomic goal hierarchy, no previous research has investigated whether
memory for complex human action is actually organized in the mind with respect to
goals. This dissertation explored the primary organization of action memory in adults and
young children and explored the role of familiarity in young children's organization of
action in memory. Borrowing from the text memory literature, a priming experiment was
designed to investigate the degree to which action memory is organized with respect to
goals versus veridical temporal structure. In all studies, participants viewed videos in
which goals were carried out in an interleaved fashion, such that the execution of a goal
was at times interrupted by action related to the other goal. In a first experiment with
adults, the results indicated that adults reorganize action information in memory in order
to emphasize goal structure relative to verbatim temporal structure. A second control
vexperiment with adults clarified that the goal priming effect observed in the first
experiment arose as a result of viewing the action scenario and was not simply due to the
stimuli cuing pre-existing semantic memory. The results of a third experiment with adults
revealed this process of goal organization is unlikely to be a by-product of goal-based
linguistic encoding, but instead reflects encoding of human action itself. Young
children's action memory was examined in a fourth experiment, and the role of children's
familiarity with the action scenarios in action memory organization was also explored.
Children did not display a significant tendency to organize action according to goal
inferences (or temporal structure, either, for that matter). As well, children's prior
familiarity with action did not modulate their memory organization to any significant
degree. Overall, the results of this dissertation suggest that adult memory for action
emphasizes goal inferences but cannot speak to how or when this process in achieved
developmentally. These findings have implications for contemporary theories of action
processing, point to commonalities in the processing of language and human action, and
open the door to future research into the development of action memory organization.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself at the airport, preparing to fly across the country to visit
relatives for the winter holidays. As you step through the sequence of events that will get
you from the entrance to your gate, your senses are assailed by a barrage of complex
information in the form of other people's behavior. Success lies in accurate processing of
others' action within each step - from navigating through fast-moving, unpredictable
crowds, interacting with the check-in clerk, and passing through the security gate. The
action in each of these scenarios can be broken down into smaller and smaller units, until
at the level of small actions: body parts moving here and there, objects being grasped and
released, motion being carried out in the blink of an eye. Your mind must process a
significant portion of this very large set of small action chunks. Although it is remarkable
that we can do this at all with seemingly little effort, it is also remarkable how much is
processed that will not be properly encoded in memory. While you could later recall
some action sequences in a coherent fashion, you would be unlikely to remember much
of the small action detail. What, then, determines what will be remembered and what will
be forgotten? An answer to this question lies partly in understanding how action
information tends to be encoded and organized in memory.
2The processing of other people's action is central to everyday social functioning,
and thus understanding the organization of action memory has important implications for
the study of social cognition, language and social cognitive development, and artificial
intelligence. Investigating memory for action allows us to infer the elements of higher-
level cognition that underlie the processing of human action. In addition, understanding
the nature of action memory representations provides a window into how people might
make use of memories for action in further social-cognitive processing.
In adults, memory encoding and storage is aided significantly by the use of top-
down knowledge: infOlmation stored in memory that guides processing. For example, if
you are technologically savvy then you know how a metal detector works, and this will
aid your processing of others' action that surrounds the metal-detector. Although many of
the actions that other people engage in around the metal-detector might differ
substantially, there is still a sequence of events that must occur in the proper operation of
the metal detector: all metal must be removed and placed in the tray before you may pass.
Knowledge of this higher-level sequence of actions likely speeds infonnation processing,
and probably also aids in highlighting portions of the action stream most relevant to one's
current goals.
But what if you have never been to the airport, and know absolutely nothing about
how metal-detectors function? Would the processes that underlie your encoding and
storage of other people's action in memory differ? This is the typical situation for young
children. Since they often lack the relevant top-down information, their processing might
be focused on the details of each and every action, rendering processing much more
3cumbersome. Or, as active knowledge seekers, they may try to apply top-down
knowledge from some other domain they know about (e.g., going to the movies) in order
to help organize their processing. In either case, their memory for such events might be
substantially different from that of adults.
This dissertation explores the relationship between top-down knowledge and
memory organization for human action, in both adults and young children. Despite a
surge of recent research on action processing, a great deal remains unknown about the
cognitive system that processes action. In particular, relatively little is known about how
action information is organized in memory. In addition, much remains to be learned
about children's memory for action. Young children are at a point in their life when they
are gathering large amounts of top-down knowledge on a daily basis, thus it is likely that
they are particularly sensitive to such information when inferring other people's goals
and intentions through their behavior. For this reason, studying young children may
provide an especially sensitive window for exploring the use of top-down information in
memory for action.
This introduction will first begin by outlining two sources of information that
action memory could plausibly be organized with respect to: information regarding goal
inferences and temporal order infonnation. I will argue that these two sources of
information are often in conflict with one another in the ongoing flow of other's action,
which has implications for how memory is organized. I will then review the literature on
action segmentation, the literature on memory for text in adul t '3, and the literature on
4memory for event sequences in young children, all of which helped give rise to the
cunent hypotheses. I will end by outlining the specific research questions addressed in
this dissertation.
Goals and Temporal Infonnation
Any account of how memory for action is encoded and organized needs to
incorporate the processing of goals and intentions. Goals and intentions are an essential
aspect of people's processing of other's behavior (Baldwin, 2005; Heider, 1958; Malle,
Moses, & Baldwin, 2001; Schult & Wellman, 1997). In the majority of cases, observers
seem less concerned about how an action is carried out (e.g., that the salt be lifted or
pushed across the table) and more concerned about the goal of the action (e.g., the
passing of the salt). Most theorists believe intentions are not contained in the action
stimulus itself, but are infened using a number of bottom-up and top-down cues. This
process of intention/goal inference is a central component of cunent theoretical
perspectives on action processing (Baldwin, 2005; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, &
Reynolds, 2007) and the development of the action processing system (Baldwin, Baird,
Saylor, & Clark, 2001; Meltzoff, 2007; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001).
When considering how dynamic human action might be encoded and organized in
memory, we might thus expect representations of action events to reflect the process of
goal inference. One possibility is that individual actions (e.g., grasping a mug, grasping a
tea kettle, pouring hot water into the mug) might be organized in such a way as to reflect
their relations vis avis an infened higher level intention (e.g., preparing a cup of tea). In
5such a scenario, information about individual actions would be stored in a meaningful
way that relates actions to one another while also representing the goal of the actor.
Moreover, information about the surface details of actions low on the goal hierarchy
might frequently be dispensed with altogether to the extent that such detail seems
irrelevant to the inferred goal structure of the scenario.
Because human action unfolds dynamically over time, processing of the inherent
temporal or sequential structure of action is an additional component that should also be
characterized in an account of action memory organization. When learning a new task,
for instance, capturing the precise temporal order of observed action events can be
essential to understanding the new task well enough to perform it later (e.g., learning to
tie a difficult knot). It is known that adults indeed register at least some kinds of temporal
information within the stream of human behavior. For example, recent research has
documented that adults track sequential information within novel intentional action
sequences and utilize the information to discover segmental structure within the sequence
(e.g., Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Swallow & Zacks, 2008).
We might thus also expect action memory to be organized with respect to the
inherent temporal structure of an action sequence. In this scenario, actions might be
associated with one another in a chain-like sequence that specifies which actions came
before and after a given action. Unlike organization according to goal structure, in some
ways organization according to temporal structure seems to be achievable without
6effortful inference, as the information is readily available from the surface flow of events.
The current event being encountered only needs to be associated with the previously
encountered event, as the perception of that event unfolds over time.
Of course, in many action scenarios, goal structure and temporal structure
coincide, with memory organization thus potentially being redundantly specified for both.
Consider for example, a person who grasps a mug, puts a tea bag into the mug, grasps a
tea kettle, pours hot water into the mug, grasps a book, and flips through the book, and
begins reading a particular page. In this scenario the temporal sequence of events matches
the grouping of actions that are associated with each of the two goals - making tea and
reading a book - and thus both types of information can be unified under one
organizational scheme. On the other hand, however, the goal structure underlying human
action frequently violates simple sequential linearity. Distinct actions serving different
goals can overlap in time, disruptions can occur, and actions serving one goal are often
purposefully interrupted by those serving a quite different goal, and subsequently
resumed. Consider for example, a person picking up a nail, picking up a hammer,
hammering the nail into wood, grasping a mug of coffee, taking a sip, and then picking
up another nail. In this sequence of action, organization via goal inferences and
organization via temporal structure diverge. Although the relative frequency of such
types of action sequences is not currently known, they may occur quite often. These non-
linearity issues beset attempts to model action computationally (e.g., Flieschman,
Decamp, & Roy, 2006), and pose an intriguing question regarding how humans organize
memory for action.
7When goal and temporal information do not coincide, which source of
information takes precedence in memory? Although both types of information could
certainly be processed to some degree, it seems plausible that one type of information
may be more primary in the memory representation compared to the other. If action
memory is organized primarily with respect to the goal structure of the action sequence,
then memory for temporal relations may be attenuated or even distorted in memory.
Alternatively, temporal relations could be emphasized over goal relations, yielding a
similar cost to storing goal-related information. My hypothesis, consonant with broader
theoretical perspectives on action processing, was that goal structure would be
emphasized over temporal structure in memory organization.
Structuring action memory primarily with respect to goals and less with respect to
temporal infonnation is likely beneficial in a number of ways. For one, it would likely aid
in the recall of action information, especially for action sequences in which goals are
disrupted or otherwise disfluent in some way. As many theorists believe that ascertaining
goals from action is an inferential process (e.g., Baldwin, 2005; Schult & Wellman, 1997;
Zacks et aI., 2007), structuring memory with respect to goals requires relatively more
processing than structuring memory with respect to temporal information. In general,
memory is improved when people engage with infol1nation at a deeper level compared to
a more shallow level (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975), and thus memory for action may be
enhanced through goal organization. In addition, to the extent that goals are indeed the
most central aspect of people's processing of human action events, structuring the action
8information with respect to goals helps preserve this most central aspect in memory. Over
time, as the memory for the event decays, memory for the small action units may be lost,
while the overall goals of the actor remain.
Although I hypothesize that goal organization generally takes precedence over
temporal organization in memory, it is important to note that this can only be the case
when goal inferences are possible. Whenever one is not able to infer a goal from
another's activity, goal information is not available as a source of information according
to which action memory can be organized, while temporal information remains readily
available for this purpose. Novel action poses this particular challenge. Without top-down
knowledge that allows one to infer the goal of the novel action, one cannot know whether
a particular action embedded in the action sequence is causally related to the unknown
goal or not. Thus, a full account ofmemory organization for dynamic human action
should detail how action memory is organized according to the types of actions that are
observed. I hypothesize that action information is primarily organized with respect to
goal structure, but that temporal structure may be more primary in situations when goal
inference is challenging or impossible.
Recent work on action segmentation helped to fuel the current hypothesis.
Although memory organization is not the primary focus of such action segmentation
research, this body of work has nevertheless illuminated several aspects of how action is
processed that may be important for action memory.
9Segmentation and Memory
A crucial component of processing other people's action involves segmenting the
continuous stream of behavior into units (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Newtson, 1973;
Newtson & Engquist, 1976; Sharon & Wynn, 1998; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001).
Despite the fact that action events are largely continuous, research indicates that people
can explicitly segment action into meaningful, discrete units (Baird & Baldwin, 2001;
Newtson, 1973; Zacks, Tversky, et aI., 2001). In these tasks, participants typically are
asked to identify boundaries or "breakpoints" of action - meaningful junctures within the
continuous flow of motion. Participants' responding in these tasks reveals a high degree
of agreement and consistency. Furthermore, breakpoints appear to hold special status in
memory, as action at breakpoints is remembered more accurately than action at non-
breakpoints (Newtson & Engquist, 1976; Schwan & Garsoffky, 2004), and action
sequences that are interrupted at breakpoints are remembered more accurately than
sequences interrupted at non-breakpoints (Boltz, 1992). Effective segmentation also leads
to better memory for action (Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby, 2006). Segmentation is
likely influenced by a variety of cues, one of which is inferences about the actor's goals
and intentions (Zacks, 2004).
In contrast to these explicit segmentation tasks, recent evidence also indicates
people spontaneously segment action online while they view other people's behavior
(Baldwin, 2005; Zacks, Braver, et aI., 2001). In one study, Baldwin, Pederson, Craven,
Andersson, and Bjork (in prep.) had participants detect frame deletions in video action
sequences that were either deleted at breakpoints or non-breakpoints. Participants were
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significantly faster at detecting deletions at breakpoints, indicating that online attention is
modulated at breakpoints. This modulation of attention is thought to reflect online
segmentation. Thus explicit segmentation tasks appear to be tapping into a
psychologically real phenomenon of online processing (see also Zacks, Braver, et aI.,
2001).
Furthermore, the effects of segmentation also influence memory. Baird and
colleagues (Baird, Baldwin, & Malle, 2009) asked participants to remember the location
of tones inserted into a sequence of everyday, intentional action. Tones either occurred at
breakpoints (e.g. just as the grasping of a pen was completed and before writing began),
or at points within a segment in the action stream (e.g., in the midst ofa reach to grasp a
pen). People were more likely to accurately remember the placement of breakpoint tones
than mid-segment tones. Furthermore, mid-segment tones were misremembered as
having occurred closer to the nearest segment boundary of the segment interrupted,
suggesting the psychological salience of segment boundaries. A similar effect has been
found in segmentation of speech (Fodor & Bever, 1965), highlighting a commonality in
processing between these two domains.
Importantly, this study indicates that segmentation influences memory for action,
and suggests action memory is organized with respect to the segmental structure of the
action sequence. Breakpoints provide an anchor in memory with respect to which
observers can organize information contained in the action sequence. It is important to
note that as yet it is unknown whether segmentation influences memory at the encoding
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phase, storage phase, or recall phase. However, the evidence from Baldwin et aI. (in
prep.) noted above suggests that encoding - as the action information is being taken in-
is at least one phase during which segmentation influences memory.
Action segmentation may also be important for memory organization with respect
to hierarchical representation. Research on explicit segmentation of action has shown that
people typically represent action in a partonomic hierarchy - that is, observers parse
action into coarse units (e.g., cleaning the kitchen), finer units from which each coarse
unit is composed (e.g., washing dishes and throwing out the trash), and into even finer
nested units still (e.g., grabbing a dish, running it under water, putting it in the tray,
Zacks, Tversky, et aI., 2001). This kind of structure provides the viewer a way of
chunking information at differing levels of granularity for differing purposes (e.g.,
inferring the actor's immediate goals versus broader or longer term goals).
Recent work by Hard (2006) goes further to suggest that hierarchical processing
of action plays a role in action memory and understanding. Prior studies from the text
comprehension literature have demonstrated that reading time is slowed at boundary
points in the text (e.g., clauses, sentences) relative to non-boundary points, and that the
amount of slowing is directly related to the size of the boundary point in the hierarchical
structure of the text (i.e., slower reading near sentence boundaries than clause boundaries,
Haberlandt & Graesser, 1989; Haberlandt, Graesser, Schneider, & Kiely, 1986). Hard
created an action analogue to these text studies, in which participants viewed slide-shows
of everyday actions, with action still frames presented one at a time in a self-paced
format. Looking time to each slide was recorded. Results showed that looking time
12
increased at boundaries relative to points mid-segment, and also as a function of
hierarchical level: that is, longer looking occurred at boundaries oflarger action units
relative to nested sub-action units, similar to the slower reading at major, relative to
minor, clause boundaries in text. Hard also found that looking time at boundary points
was significantly correlated with participants' later recall of the action sequences. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive processing increases closer to
segment boundaries (Baldwin et aI., in prep.). In addition, they suggest that hierarchical
encoding of action positively enhances memory for action. Finally, they also point to an
additional commonality in the online processing of language and human action.
To summarize, people can explicitly and spontaneously segment action according
to the hierarchical structure ofthe actor's goals, and some evidence indicates this pattern
of segmentation influences memory for action. I hypothesize that action memory is
organized hierarchically and primarily emphasizes the inferred goal structure of the
action sequence. However, although previous research suggests that hierarchical structure
is important for action memory, surprisingly no direct evidence as yet demonstrates that
action memory is in fact structured with respect to goals. In developing ways in which to
test this idea, I took inspiration from past research on memory for text. Studies on text
memory have demonstrated that memory for information in text emphasizes hierarchical
representation of propositions, even when this conflicts with the sequential structure
occurring in the text presentation itself.
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Studies of Memory for Text
Language and action, though dissimilar in a number of ways, share some
important similarities. In both domains a complex, dynamic stimulus must be analyzed on
multiple levels in parallel on-the-fly. Regarding language, it has been shown that these
processing challenges result in poor memory for the precise wording of a sentence; the
surface form of a sentence decays rapidly from memory over time (Fillenbaum, 1966;
Sachs, 1967). It is widely believed that once the listener has encoded enough of the
relevant surface information in order to decode its meaning, the meaning components of
sentences are stored as propositions (Kintsch & Keenan, 1973). Propositions are concepts
that predicate a relation with respect to its arguments (e.g., in 'Scott ate a pizza', 'eating'
specifies a particular kind of gustatory relation between' Scott' and 'pizza').
If sentences are stored propositionally, then what of whole sections of discourse
or passages of text? McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) provided evidence that propositions are
organized in memory in a hierarchical fashion with little reference to the surface structure
of the text. The logic behind this study will form the basis behind the design of the
proposed research concerning human action, so I will review it in detail here. Participants
in their study read passages of text and were asked afterwards to verify whether particular
propositions had been encountered in the text they had just read. Each text was analyzed
in terms of its underlying propositional hierarchy, meaning that the relationship between
propositions in the text could be described in terms of both surface distance (proximity in
terms of the number of intervening propositions in the original verbatim text) and
meaning distance (proximity in terms of the number of intervening propositions in the
14
hierarchy). Importantly, propositions at different levels in the meaning hierarchy were
intermingled in the surface structure of the text, which allowed McKoon and Ratcliff to
select pairs ofpropositions as primes which were maximally contrasted in terms of
surface distance and meaning distance. Participants were significantly faster at velifying
target propositions ifthey were preceded by propositions close to the target in meaning
structure but far from the target in surface structure than if they were preceded by
propositions close in surface structure but far in meaning structure. This meaning priming
advantage clarified that memory for text emphasizes hierarchical representation of
component propositions, rather than the sequential surface structure of the text.
A control experiment indicated this priming effect manifested only after reading
the text passages, ann thus was not due to extraneous differences between the two prime
types or pre-existing semantic memory. In this experiment, instead of reading the actual
passages, participants studied a randomly organized set of sentences from the passages.
Participants were tested in the identical manner (i.e., asked to verify whether they had
seen propositions before), with the same targets, meaning primes, and surface primes. If
inherent extraneous differences or pre-existing semantic associations produced the
priming effect in the first experiment, then they should have been evident in this
experiment as well. In fact, the results of this control revealed no difference in priming
between surface and meaning primes, suggesting the results of the first experiment were
due to the organization in memory ofthe newly encountered text material.
Thus, the information encountered in text is initially processed in tenns of surface
detail but ultimately encoded as propositions, organized hierarchically in memory
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primarily in terms of meaning relations. Interestingly, at least some parts of this process
do not appear to be limited to comprehending text. For example, Gernsbacher (1985)
provided evidence that loss of surface information occurs in picture narratives - stories
told only with sequences of pictures - as well. It is entirely possible that this pattern of
surface information loss and organizational restructuring is a domain-general processing
tendency, utilized whenever people are faced with analyzing and comprehending
complex, structured sequences of information. If so, it is highly plausible that similar
effects of surface information loss and memory reorganization could exist for the
processing and storage of dynamic human action.
Although this review of the research on text memory supports the general notion
that the primary organization of action memory could reflect hierarchical inferences
about goals, I was also interested in the developmental pathways to this form of memory
organization. To this end, I also looked to the rich literature on children's event memory
and imitation for clues about whether goal and temporal information are processed by
young children, and how action memory might be organized in this younger population.
Studies of Event Memory and Imitation in Children
One methodological tool which has been invaluable in exploration of memory
development is imitation. Research using imitation has demonstrated that important
aspects of children's memory systems are present from fairly early in infancy, and that a
great deal of maturation over the course of memory development is quantitative in nature
rather than qualitative.
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Bauer and colleagues, elaborating on ideas from Piaget (1962) and Meltzoff and
Moore (1977), have used imitation to extensively explore young children's memory for
events (Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Mandler, 1989, 1992; Bauer & Shore, 1987). The standard
procedure used in these studies is to expose children to three- or four-step action
sequences in which the experimenter manipulates some toys, and then give the toys to the
children and asks them to reenact the sequence through imitation. This research has
demonstrated that very young children - starting as young as 9 months - are sensitive to
the temporal information contained in action sequences, and are often able to recall the
steps involved in the sequence in the correct order they occurred. The amount of temporal
information that children can store and maintain in memory increases with age.
Very early on this line of research indicated the causal structure of the action
sequences has a major impact on children's ability to recall the events. Bauer has dubbed
these causal features "enabling relations" (Bauer & Shore, 1987). An enabling
relationship between actions is one in which one action must be executed before another
action can be executed. An example enabling relation used in Bauer and Mandler (1989)
was the Frog-jump, which involved placing a wooden board on a block, placing the frog
on the lowered end of the board, and then hitting the elevated end of the board to catapult
the frog into the air. In this instance, placing the frog on the board is a necessary
condition before the catapulting can occur, and thus there is an enabling relation between
these two events. Other sequences of action - arbitrary relations - have no such necessary
causal relation, in which any event can be preceded or followed by any other event in the
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sequence. Bauer has found that children can recall the order of steps involved in action
sequences significantly better ifthey involve enabling relations over arbitrary relations
(Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Mandler, 1989, 1992; Bauer & Shore, 1987).
Memory for sequences of action involving arbitrary relations does improve with
age. Improvements occur between 16 months and 28 months, and significant
improvements can still be seen between 3 and 4 years (Bauer, 2006). However, memory
for sequences involving enabling relations always has a significant advantage over
memory for sequences involving arbitrary relations. Even when children are given
repeated exposure to sequences of arbitrary relations, the temporal order of sequences
involving enabling relations is still recalled significantly more accurately.
What is it about enabling relations that make them more memorable? Bauer has
argued that enabling relations are grouped and represented as a chunk or unit of
information in memory, thus reducing the processing load for memory storage. Evidence
to support this claim comes from experimental demonstrations that these units are
resistant to interruption (Bauer, 1992), similar to the demonstrations of unit resistance
that have been shown in language processing described earlier (Fodor & Bever, 1965). In
these studies, children are presented with a sequence of actions in which an action
unrelated to an enabling relation is inserted between the two parts of the enabling relation
(e.g., between the placing of the frog on the board and the launching of the frog). In their
reproduction of the sequence, children display systematic errors in ordering that suggest
the unitization in memory. In particular, they are most likely to reproduce the enabling
18
relations sequentially adjacent and the interrupting action either before or after the
enabling relation. This effect is also stronger after a delay is imposed between exposure
and test.
Although Bauer has argued that this effect reflects chunking of steps together in
memory, a number of alternatives have not yet been ruled out. For instance, children
might find the enabling relations inherently more interesting, and thus they are better
attended to and encoded more reliably in memory. Relatedly, children may accurately
remember that another step intervened in the enabling relation, but poor inhibitory
control skills render children unable to stop themselves from executing the inherently
more interesting step in the enabling sequence.
However, assuming that children do chunk these units together in memory, this
may in fact be evidence of children's hierarchical representation of action based upon
top-down, goal-related causal knowledge. Infants and young children may be
representing these two-step small-action sequences as a goal unit based upon the fact that
they are causally related in a transparent fashion. Research indicates that even very young
infants understand basic physical principles such as solidity, gravity, and support
(Baillargeon, 2004; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). These basic
physical principles might act as a form of top-down knowledge that children bring to
these situations which enables them to infer a higher-level goal unit (e.g, make the frog
jump). When an arbitrary action is enacted that interrupts an enabling relation, children
may reorganize the action information in memory according to its goal structure, and
recall the goal-related enabling relations as having occurred adjacent in time. In the
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situations Bauer and colleagues have used so far, only basic physical knowledge is
needed in order to infer the goal of the actor. However, with more complex novel stimuli,
one could assess the role of top-down knowledge in this process of goal inference - and
possibly unitization of action in memory - by manipulating the level of knowledge
children receive regarding the novel stimuli. To my knowledge, this research question has
not been addressed directly.
Related work has demonstrated that goal infonnation can indeed modulate
children's imitation of other's action. Williamson and Markman (2006) experimentally
manipulated the degree to which 3- to 4-year-old children understood the overall goal of
the action sequence. Somewhat counter-intuitively, at least on the face of it, when
children were not aware of the actor's goal they were actually more faithful imitators
compared to when they did know the goal of the actor. That is, they were more likely to
imitate the exact temporal sequence of actions if they did not know the goal. The authors
suggest that children selectively attend and encode only those actions that are relevant to
the goal when they are aware of the goal, and that without knowing what the goal of the
action is children attend and encode more action detail, including veridical temporal
sequencing.
Interestingly, however, similar work by Homer and Whiten (2005) as well as
Lyons, Young, and Keil (2007) appears to contradict the results of Williamson and
Markman (2006), and suggests 3- to 4-year-old children are faithful imitators even when
causal knowledge is readily available. In their tasks children are presented with a novel
causal object, and the experimenter provides a demonstration using both causally relevant
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and causally irrelevant actions. When children are asked to imitate, they imitate all
actions, causally irrelevant or not. This is the case even when children can directly
observe the causal irrelevance of the actions (Horner & Whiten), and also when they are
given direct instructions not to imitate causally irrelevant action (Lyons). This
phenomenon has been dubbed "overimitation."
How can these two seemingly opposing sets of results be unified? Lyons et al.
(2007) offer the plausible suggestion that the key difference between selectively imitating
and overimitating is likely due to different cognitive strategies children utilize in the face
of relative novelty. In the stimuli and the action sequences used by Williamson and
Markman (2006), relatively familiar stimuli were used, and thus the goal and the relevant
top-down knowledge were likely very clear to children. Thus, they were able to
selectively process or reorganize their representation according to the infened goal
structure. Contrast that with the stimuli used by Horner and Whiten (2005) and Lyons et
aI., which were much more novel relative to those used by Williamson and Markman.
This novelty likely caused children to adopted a different cognitive strategy in which
children focused on all aspects of the actor's action as potentially causally relevant and
goal-related. Their imitation was thus modulated according to these adjustments. As both
Lyons and Williamson and Markman suggest, children are "flexible imitators", and are
able to vary their imitation according to the task demands (see also Williamson, Meltzoff,
and Markman (2008), for a similar point).
To sum up, the research on event memory and imitation with infants and young
children suggests that children are sensitive to sequential temporal information starting
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early on in infancy, but that the causal features of the events playa role in the
organization of event memory. It is possible that the causal features of the event may
allow children to infer goal units and structure memory according to those inferred goals.
Research on imitation also suggests that by 3 to 4 years of age children become sensitive
to contextual factors which alter their memory for goal and temporal information
contained in events; In particular, novelty seems to increase children's adherence in
memory to the temporal structure of events.
The Current Experiments
The goal of the current experiments was to identify the primary form of
organization for action memory, to assess whether developmental differences exist
between adults and young children in this regard, and explore the contribution of
familiarity in possible developmental differences.
Action sequences in which two goals are carried out in an interleaved fashion
contain goal infornlation diverges from the surface-level temporal structure of the
sequence. These types of action sequences provide a vehicle to test the hypothesis that
action memory may be organized primmily according to goals, as these sequences can be
organized in memory in more than one possible way, each way leading to a testable
prediction. Such sequences could be organized according to the veridical temporal
sequence, in which actions that occur adjacent to one another in the temporal sequence-
irrespective of their goal relatedness - are more closely related in memory. Alternatively,
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they could be organized according to the goal structure, in which actions that are related
to the same over-arching goal - irrespective of their temporal distance from one another -
are related more closely in memory.
The research on action segmentation suggests that goals are prominent in people's
online processing of action, as well as in their recall of action events. Hierarchical
encoding of action goals also appears to be a fundamental aspect of how action is
segmented and processed online. Thus, although organization via goals and organization
via temporal structure are both possible, I hypothesized that organization according to
inferred goal structure would be the primary organizational strategy in memory. As
discussed previously, this form of organization likely has advantages over temporal
organization, as it involves relatively deeper processing and helps to preserve the overall
goals of the actor in memory.
Note that organization according to goals for events in which goals are carried out
in an interleaved fashion requires that action events be reorganized in memory. For such
events, temporal organization does not require reorganization - it simply reflects the
order in which action information was encountered. However, if goal organization is
more primary, then the action information must be reorganized to keep disparate goal-
related actions together in memory. The literature on text memory suggests that a
comparable process of reorganization does indeed occur when people read relatively
complex passages of text. If reorganization according to meaning can occur, then it
seemed plausible that reorganization for action meaning - i.e., goals - could also occur.
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In Experiment 1 the hypothesis that goal organization is more primary than
temporal organization in action memory was tested by constructing a task very similar to
the one used by McKoon and Ratcliff (1980), but adopted for human action. In this task,
participants viewed sequences of action in which two goals were carried out in an
interleaved fashion, instead of one after the other. Participants' memory for the videos
was tested using still frames, and within the test pariicular target frames were primed by
goal relevant frames versus temporally relevant frames. Both types of prime frames were
maximally separated on their respective dimensions - that is, goal primes shared the goal
of the target but occurred far in time from the target, while temporal primes occurred very
near in time to the target but did not share the goal of the target. I predicted that priming
participants' memory for such actions sequences with goal-relevant information would
lead to improved recall performance relative to priming with temporally relevant
information.
The goal of Experiment 2 was to fine-tune the results of Experiment 1. This
experiment was a control experiment, similar to the one used by McKoon and Ratcliff
(1980), which examined the extent to which any priming differences observed in
Experiment 1 were the result of newly formed memory structure as opposed to
preexisting semantic structure. Because my stimuli involved activities that would be
highly familiar to adults, there existed a risk that any priming differences I observed in
Experiment 1 could be due to semantic and/or episodic memory associations that
pariicipants had formed prior to watching the videos. In Experiment 2 paliicipants
viewed randomly organized still frames instead of the actual videos, so that their memory
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for the images could be tested with the same priming structure as in Experiment 1. Any
priming differences observed in this context would reflect pre-existing memory
associations, and would suggest that the results of Experiment 1 were confounded with
this phenomenon. I hypothesized that priming differences would only emerge after
viewing the actual action sequences.
Experiment 3 was aimed at elucidating the role of language in action memory
organization. It is possible that action organization is mediated by linguistic coding of the
action events. Action sequences that are coded linguistically essentially represent a
narrative of the actor's activities. It is possible that people generate goal inferences as a
result of this narrative construction process. Thus, any goal-priming advantage relative to
temporal priming could arise as a result of a narrative-based reorganization, rather than as
a product of action processing per se. Experiment 3 explored this intriguing possibility by
having participants engage in the same memory priming task used in Experiment 1, but
while they watchecl the videos participants simultaneously shadowed linguistic material. I
hypothesized that shadowing would engage participants' linguistic systems to such a
degree as to make linguistic recoding of the action sequences difficult. Iflinguistic
recoding is the source of priming differences observed in Experiment 1, then priming
differences should be significantly reduced by the shadowing manipulation.
Although I hypothesized that adults reorganize action infonnation in memory
according to inferred goals, there was reason to believe that children may show a
different pattern. The research on imitation and event memory suggests that
developmental differences may exist between adults and children in the degree to which
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temporal information is processed and stored in memory, and also suggests that
familiarity with the action sequences may playa role in this process. Children appear to
be sensitive to temporal information, and when actions and situations are relatively novel,
their sensitivity to temporal information appears to be increased. In situations that are
relatively familiar however, children appear to pay little attention to temporal
information. Furthermore, in situations where the novelty is low and the causal principles
of the actions allow children to infer a goal, there is evidence to suggest that goal
information takes precedence over temporal information.
Thus, in Experiment 4 I assessed the degree to which 6-year-old children organize
action memory according to inferred goals or temporal structure. The motivation for
selecting this age group was largely atheoretical; This age group was chosen because it
was the minimum age that could appropriately complete the memory task that adults
performed in Experiment 1. I modified the task that was used with adults only such that it
would be engaging and enjoyable for young children. Otherwise, the stimuli and the
priming structure of the memory test were identical to those used with adults. Because
this priming task only required visual recognition of the information contained in the
action sequences, it was not heavily confounded with elements of executive function. In
studies of action memory that use imitation as the main dependent measure, the child's
imitative response is confounded with inhibitory control: children may be unable to
inhibit the motor response for carrying out a salient sequence of actions, despite the fact
that they correctly remember that another action interrupted the salient sequence. The
task I used thus allowed for a more sensitive test of action memory organization in young
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children than those that have been employed previously. I also developed a questionnaire
for parents to complete (the Activity Survey) which asked them to rate their child's
familiarity with each of the activities depicted in the videos, in order to assess the role of
familiarity with children's memory performance and priming differences. I hypothesized
that, for children, goal organization would be more primary for videos that involved
highly familiar activities, but that for relatively novel activities temporal organization
would be more primary.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the organization of
memory for human action emphasizes inferred underlying goal structures relative to
temporal surface structure. To this end, I conducted an experiment analogous to that of
McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) on organization of text in memory, modified for use with
videos of human action. Participants watched videos of human action involving two
commonly associated high-level goals (e.g., ironing and folding laundry). The actions
related to the two distinct goals were carried out such that they were to some degree
intermingled. Although behavior was continuous, actions related to goal A were
interrupted in order to carry out actions related to goal B, then goal A interrupted goal B,
then goal B interrupted goal A for a final time. Thus, for observers, the videos could be
represented in memory in terms of goal structure (e.g., each goal represented, with sub-
goals nested underneath) and/or in terms of temporal structure (e.g., the temporal
sequence within the actual motion stream). After watching each video, participants were
shown a series of still frames. For each still frame they were asked to verify whether the
frame was from the video they had just watched. The still frame series included target
frames, goal primes, and temporal primes, selected from each video. Goal plimes were
frames of action from the same goal as the target, but relatively distant with respect to the
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temporal structure ofthe video. Temporal primes were the opposite: they were frames
relatively close to the target in telIDS of temporal structure, but from a different goal than
the target. For a given target, either a goal prime or a temporal prime immediately
preceded the target frame during the test. If organization of action memory emphasizes
goal structure, then participants should be faster at verifying the target frame when it is
preceded by a goal prime compared to a temporal prime. In other words, inferred goal
relations should serve as more effective primes than surface temporal relations.
Method
Participants
Participants were 78 adults, all students enrolled at the University of Oregon (39
female). Participants received partial course credit for their participation in the
experiment.
Stimuli
The digital video stimuli consisted of 16 videos of everyday human action. Each
video involved two commonly associated but causally independent high-level goals. As
described earlier, actions related to each of the goals were enacted in an intermingled
fashion (e.g., two goal A actions, followed by three goal B actions, followed by two goal
A actions, etc.). The purpose of this intemlingling was to ensure that observers could
potentially represent each video in at least two different ways: in terms of temporal
structure and/or in terms of goal structure. The videos ranged in length from 51 to 116
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seconds (M = 77.63, SD = 18.40), and the frame rate was 30 frames per second. Each
video measured 720 (w) x 528 (h) pixels. A short description of each video can be found
in Table 1, while a detailed script of the activities can be found in Appendix A. Half of
the videos were specifically designed to involve activities that would be highly familiar
to young children, for us~ in Experiment 4.
Five types of still frames were selected from each video: target frames, goal and
temporal primes, and true and false fillers. Two target frames were selected from each
video, one from each high-level goal. Two goal primes and two temporal primes were
also selected from each video, one of each type for each target frame. Goal primes were
frames of action from the same goal as the target; in addition, these frames were
specifically selected to have occurred relatively distant from the target in terms of the
temporal structure of the action sequence (M = 31.13 s, SD = 12.04). Temporal primes
were frames of action relatively close in actual time to the target (M= 7.96 s, SD = 3.46),
but involving actions from the other goal. The aim in selecting goal primes relatively far
from the target in time was to maximally contrast the two types of primes in their relevant
goal and temporal properties. Due to the length and nature of the videos, primes from the
first target in a video always had goal and temporal primes that occurred after the target
frame in the video, while primes associated with the second target frame in the video
always preceded that target frame in the video. Thus the directionality of temporal vs.
goal primes with respect to target frames was balanced for a given target and fully
counterbalanced across the videos.
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Table 1. The J6 video scenarios.
Scenario Description
Coloring and blocks In a play room, the actor creates a block figure while
drawing a picture with crayons
Cooking and cleaning In a kitchen, the actor puts away cooking items while
making a sandwich
Combing and teeth In a bathroom, the actor brushes her teeth while combing her
hair and arranging it in a ponytail
Computer and cleaning In an office, the actor cleans up a messy desk while
unpacking and setting up a laptop computer
Filing and microwave In an office, the actor files away stacks of papers while
microwaving some food
Food and cooking In a kitchen, the actor gets food items out of the fridge while
boiling water and cooking a meal
Frying and calling In a kitchen, the actor fries eggs while getting out the
phonebook and making a call
Ironing and folding In a living room, the actor sets up a shirt for ironing while
folding towels
Reading and eating In a reading room, the actor selects and reads a book while
eating a banana
Running and books In a bedroom, the actor puts on running shoes while putting
away books on a shelf
Socks and toys In a play room, the actor puts on socks while selecting and
playing with some toys
Sweeping and dishes In a kitchen, the actor sweeps the floor while putting away
clean dishes
Tea and recipes In a kitchen, the actor makes tea while selecting a recipe
book and reading it
Train and toys In a play room, the actor sets up a toy train track while
cleaning up a mess of toys
Video game and drink In a living room, the actor sets up a video game system while
pouring a soda
Windows and trunk In a driveway, the actor washes the windows of the car while
packing luggage into the trunk
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Two true fillers and four false fillers were also selected for each video. The
purpose ofthe false fillers was to ensure the test was an actual test of memory. That is, if
participants' responses genuinely reflected memory for having viewed the actions in each
sequence, then they should be able to accurately answer "no" to the question regarding
whether they had previously viewed false fillers.
False fillers were frames from extended footage of unrelated action sequences
with the same actor in the same setting that participants did not actually view. For
example, in the video in which the actor washes the windows of his car and packs the
trunk, one ofthe false fillers was a still frame of the actor checking the tire pressure. The
purpose of the true fillers was to increase the length of the test, thereby providing more
data for computing each participant's mean reaction time for correct positive
identification (i.e., a correct "yes" response). True fillers were additional frames taken
from the video sequence - one from each goal - that were not relevant as primes (i.e.,
they never immediately preceded a target frame in the test).
Figure 1 displays the script for one video, represented in terms of both the
veridical temporal structure and the goal structure, as well as both target frames and their
corresponding goal and temporal primes.
Video creation and frame selection were carried out with a number of constraints
in mind. First, care was taken to ensure that extraneous differences between the primes
and their respective targets were not systematically biased in favor of one type of prime
over the other. For example, I ensured that whatever differences were manifest in actor
location, body posture or eye gaze with respect to the target were not systematically
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associated with one prime type compared to the other. Second, in all cases, targets and
prime frames were only taken from breakpoints of the action stream within a particular
goal. In order to test the hypothesis that action is organized according to goals in
memory, it was essential that the goal of the frame was readily identifiable by
participants to ensure the high-level goal was appropriately activated, if such structure
existed. Given that breakpoints are more informative than non-breakpoints at depicting
goal-related information (e.g., Newtson & Engquist, 1976), only breakpoints were
selected.
Similarity Ratings
Although the stimuli were carefully designed in order to minimize systematic
perceptual differences between goal primes and temporal primes relative to the target, it
was still possible that goal primes were more similar to the targets overall. Since goal
primes, by their very definition, involve actions and objects that are typically associated
with the action depicted in target frames, they might have been more similar to targets in
some surface sense compared to temporal primes simply because they involved related
activities and objects. If this were the case, participants might have been primed to
respond faster due to overall similarity rather than goal-relatedness per se.
In order to examine this possibility in greater detail, a separate group of 50
participants (28 female) were asked to rate the similarity of goal primes and temporal
primes relative to the targets. Ratings were completed online. Participants viewed two
still frames - a prime and its target - side by side, and were asked to rate how similar the
pictures were on a seven point scale, where 1 was not at all similar and 7 was extremely
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Example video: Sweeping and Dishes
a) Temporal Representation:
l~L:J~ Sweepfloor Getutensils Pututensils indrawer
Get
dustpan
l::J-et Put cupscups '--__in__-'_ cupboardSweep Throw Lean Opendirt into f--------. away f--------. broom ------. cupboard f-------.dustpan dirt on door
b) Goal Representation:
Goal:
Sweep Floor
Get
broom
Sweep
floor
Get
dustpan
Sweep
dirt into
dustpan
Throw
away
dirt
Lean
broom
on door
Goal:
Put away
dishes
c) Prime and target infonnation:
Get
utensils
Put
utensils in
drawer
Open
cupboard
Get
cups
Put cups
in
cupboard
Prime type
Goal
Temporal
Goal
Temporal
Prime frame
Get dustpan
Get utensils
Put utensils in drawer
Throwaway dirt
Target frame
Sweep floor
Open cupboard
Figure J. Example video according to a) veridical temporal organization and b) goal
organization, and c) the two targets and respective prime frames.
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similar. Participants were told the pictures were very similar to start with, as all involved
the same person in the same location at the same camera angle, and were asked to
provide similarity judgments after already taking these factors into account.
Perceptual Similarity
In order to examine the possibility that goal primes were more similar to temporal
primes in greater detail, I also compared the objective amount of physical difference
between each of the prime types and their respective targets. The pixel values of each
prime frame and its target were compared using the following algorithm:
h wLL~(RPij - RTij ) 2 +(GPij - GTi) 2 + (BPij - BTij ) 2
i=l j=l
where R, G and B represent the red, green, and blue color values of a pixel, P and T
denote the prime frame and target frame, i and j represent the coordinate value of the
pixel, and hand w represent the height and width of the frames in pixels. The average
amount of pixel change for the goal primes and temporal primes was computed. If goal
primes were more similar to the target frames in an objective sense (e.g., similar body
and object positions), then the magnitude of pixel change for the goal primes should be
significantly smaller than the magnitude of pixel change for the temporal primes.
However, goal primes (M = 12368106.12, SD = 4740638.33) actually displayed larger
physical changes on average compared to temporal primes (M = 11045212.32, SD =
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4890126.73), though this difference was not significant, t(62) = 1.10,p = .28. Thus, this
analysis assured that the two prime types were statistically equated in their objective
perceptual similarity to the targets.
Design and Procedure
The 16 stimulus videos and 16 associated test trials were separated into four
blocks. Each block involved a study phase containing four videos and a test phase
containing the four associated tests. In the study phase, participants viewed the four
videos. After watching each video, participants were asked to write down a prediction
about what the actor was about to do next on a sheet ofpaper. This was done to ensure
that participants accurately processed the actions performed by the actor in the video.!
After watching all four videos in the study phase, the test phase began. Tests for each
video were conducted serially, in the order that the videos were presented in the study
phase. On each trial of a video test, a still frame was presented and remained on the
screen until the pal1icipant responded. A 150 millisecond blank screen separated each
trial following the participant's response (this inter-stimulus interval was adopted from
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980). A total of 10 trials comprised each video test: two for each of
the target frames, two for each of the prime frames, one for each target (one goal prime,
one temporal prime), and six filler trials (two true fillers and two false fillers). The order
of trials within a particular video test was determined pseudo-randomly to ensure
variability across tests while also maintaining adequate spacing between each of the
1 After each participant completed the experiment, the experimenter looked over their response to the
prediction question for each video. While no formal qualitative analysis was completed, all participants
offered predictions which were reasonable given the activities they saw in the contexts in which they
OCCUlTed.
36
target-prime pairs in the list. Specifically, targets were never presented first or second,
primes immediately preceded targets, and targets were never immediately followed by
the other target's prime. The order of targets in the test and the type of prime preceding
each target was also fully counterbalanced between-subjects. The order of video
presentation across the four blocks was entirely random.
A Macintosh G5 computer was used to present stimuli and record participant
responses on a 19.5" x 12" cinema display. From where participants were seated, videos
subtended approximately 9.29 degrees of visual angle. Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997)
was used to conduct the experiment and record responses.
Following provision of informed consent, participants were told that they would
be presented videos of everyday, human action, and their memory for the videos would
be tested. After the experimenter explained the task generally, participants completed a
short practice study phase and test phase, consisting of only two videos and two video
tests. These two videos were unrelated to the 16 videos used in the experimental
procedure, were a similar length and involved a similar number of actions. During the
practice study phase, participants watched each video, and after viewing each video were
prompted to make a prediction about what the actor would do next. The practice test
phase immediately followed the practice study phase. Participants were asked to judge
whether or not a still frame was from the video they saw. Similar to the experimental
tests, the practice tests involved 10 still frames, four which were false and six which were
true. There were no target or prime still frames during the practice phase. Participants
made their judgments using specially marked "Yes" and "No" keys (location
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counterbalanced across participants). They were instructed to make their judgments as
quickly and accurately as possible. Following the first practice video test, the
experimenter informed the participant that all of the "No" trials would involve the actor
performing entirely different activities than they performed in the video, and would not
involve minor changes such as the location of the objects. This was done to ensure that
participants were only focusing on the actions of the actor, and not surface details (as
pilot work demonstrated participants tend to assume minor surface changes, which leads
to very long reaction times). Following the practice phase, the experimenter left the room
and the real trials began. Each ofthe four blocks comprising the real trials involved all of
the same steps as the practice trials, but with four videos and video tests each block
instead of two.
Results
Trials in which a participant correctly identified both the target and the prime that
preceded it were used to calculate mean target reaction times. Only data from pmiicipants
who correctly identified 75% or more of the targets (N = 74) were used in the analysis, in
order to ensure that mean target reaction times were reliable. The mean proportion correct
was .91 (SD = .04). Reaction times longer than 2.5 standard deviations above a
participant's mean reaction times were also omitted. All means reported below are raw
reaction time means. However, in order to reduce positive skew that is typical with
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reaction time data, all within-subject statistical tests and effect sizes were calculated
based on natural log transforms of the reaction time data.
Recall that I predicted goal priming would facilitate memory recognition for the
target in comparison to temporal priming. This was indeed the case, as participants
identified targets primed by goal information (M= 1127.27 ms, SD = 274.05)
significantly faster than targets primed by temporal information (M = 1166.45 ms, SD =
262.49), t(73) = 2.22,p = .03, Cohen's d = 0.26. This priming difference did not emerge
as a function of accuracy, however, as there were no significant differences in the
proportion of goal-primed targets missed (M = .08, SD = .08) compared to temporal-
primed targets (M = .09, SD = .07), t(73) = 0.42, P = .67.
I also compared goal and temporal priming in an analysis treating target frames,
rather than participants, as the random variable. In this case, targets primed by goal
information (M = 1126.40 ms, SD = 199.07) tended to elicit faster identification than
targets primed by temporal information (M = 1188.82 ms, SD = 201.50), and this
difference approached significance, t(31) = 1.85,p = .074, Cohen's d= 0.33. Again, this
priming difference was not observed when comparing the proportion of misses for targets
primed by goal information (M = .09, SD = .12) and temporal information (M = .09, SD =
.10), t(31) = 0.35,p = .73.
Similarity Analyses
Similarity ratings between each type of prime and its respective target were
compared using a paired t-test. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether
goal and temporal primes systematically differed in their overall similarity to the targets.
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This analysis revealed that, despite concerted efforts in the design phase to avoid this,
goal primes (M = 4.22, SD = 0.62) were perceived as significantly more similar to the
target than temporal primes (M = 3.91, SD = 0.55), t(31) = 2.25, p = .032, Cohen's d =
0.40. Although the earlier pixel-change analysis suggested that goal primes were not
more similar to targets in an objective physical sense, this finding nonetheless raised the
concern that the advantage for goal primes over temporal primes might have been due to
similarity and not memory organization per se.
In order to assess the degree to which the goal priming advantage could be
explained by differences in similarity, I correlated each target's goal priming advantage
(mean goal primed RT - mean temporal primed RT) with each target's goal similarity
advantage (mean goal similarity rating - mean temporal similarity rating). If the goal
priming advantage varied according to similarity differences between the two prime
types, then there should be a negative correlation between these variables. However, this
correlation was not significant, r(30) = -.037,p = .84. I also correlated the difference in
pixel change between the goal primes and the temporal primes (mean goal prime pixel
change - mean temporal prime pixel change) and correlated this with each target's goal
priming advantage (as above). If the goal priming advantage was driven by the degree of
pixel change (with more similar primes having displaying less pixel change), then there
should be a positive correlation between these variables. However, this correlation was
also not significant, r(30) = .269, p = .14. Taken together these findings argue against a
strong role for similarity in influencing participants' reaction times.
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Despite this reassurance, I also conducted an analysis in which certain targets
were removed from the analysis in order to equate the similarity of goal primes and
temporal primes. In order to achieve this effect with as little disruption to the estimation
of participants' mean reaction times as possible, I iteratively removed targets, in order of
their similarity difference (beginning with those ranked highest in similarity difference),
until the difference was no longer significant. Thus three targets were removed: one each
from the videos Cooking and Cleaning, Socks and Toys, and Tea and Recipes. With their
removal the similarity difference between goal primes and temporal primes was no longer
statistically significant, t(28) = 1.36, p = .186. If the goal priming advantage found in the
initial analyses was due to increased similarity between prime and target, then the
advantage should be diminished when using a set of targets for which there was no longer
a statistically significant similarity difference. However, when these targets were
removed from participants' mean target reaction times, the reaction time advantage for
verifying targets primed by goal infonnation (M= 1113.30 ms, SD = 258.47) relative to
temporal infonnation (M = 1153.21 ms, SD= 241.94) remained statistically significant,
t(73) = 2.49,p = .015, Cohen's d = 0.29. In addition, when these three targets were
removed from the analysis treating targets, rather than participants, as the random factor,
the priming advantage for goal infonnation (M= 1104.55 ms, SD = 194.61) compared to
temporal infonnation (M= 1184.00 ms, SD = 209.74) achieved significance, t(28) = 2.23,
p = .034, Cohen's d = 0.41. In sum, the convergence between this analysis and the
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correlational analyses suggests the observed differences in similarity ratings between goal
primes and temporal primes were not the source of the goal priming advantage in this
task.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the predictions. People appear to readily
extract the goal structure of complex action sequences, and the organization of memory
for these sequences emphasizes that goal structure. Although it would be entirely
plausible for action memory organization to emphasize the order in which action
information is encountered, this does not appear to be the case, at least for sequences of
the kind that were presented, in which goal infonnation is readily inferred. Rather than
centering on a veridical representation of the flow of actions presented, action memory
instead more strongly reflects encoding of inferences regarding the goals and intentions
of the actor, and the causal relationships linked to those goals and intentions. This type of
memory organization is similar to the organizational strategy that has been proposed for
encoding propositions in memory (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980). Importantly, however,
these results should not be taken to indicate that no temporal infonnation is stored in
memory for action, but simply that goal organization is emphasized relative to temporal
information.
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At the outset, I was concerned that goal primes might be more similar to the target
frames compared to temporal primes because they involve highly related actions and
objects. Although I took considerable care in stimulus design to overcome this concern,
and although I confirmed that goal primes were not more perceptually similar to targets
in an objective sense, I nevertheless felt it important to empirically assess whether
precautions in this regard were psychologically effective. To this end, I collected
similarity ratings from a different group of participants, and conducted a series of
statistical analyses to address the extent to which objective and perceived differences
might have influenced the findings. These analyses indicated clearly that the similarity
advantage for goal primes exerted little influence on the presence or the magnitude of the
observed goal priming advantage.
Although I felt assured that the results of Experiment 1 did not arise merely as a
result of a similarity confound, there remained an alternative explanation for the results.
Specifically, it was possible that the goal priming advantage was the result of the test still
frames triggering pre-existing memory organization, rather than the result of memory
encoding during the viewing of the action sequences within the experimental session. Put
another way, the priming advantage seen at test could simply have had its source in the
test still frames activating pre-existing mental networks, instead of arising from activation
of newly formed memory networks for the action sequences themselves.
Recall that McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) considered this possible explanation for
the meaning priming advantage they discovered in their experiments on memory for text,
and designed a control experiment to assess this possibility. In their control experiment,
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participants viewed the identical sentences that had appeared in the passages in their
original experiment, but in a randomly organized fashion instead of in the original,
nanatively coherent passage. Control study participants were then tested in the identical
manner as the original experiment with the same targets and primes. The results revealed
no advantage for meaning primes over surface primes in this context, clarifying that the
priming advantage observed in the original expeliment was a reflection of newly fonned
memories derived in the context of reading sentences within a coherent nanative. Thus,
in Experiment 2 I designed an analogous version ofMcKoon and Ratcliff's control
experiment to address the parallel question regarding organization in action memory.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was aimed at clarifying the results of Experiment 1. The goal
priming advantage observed in Experiment 1 could have been due to accessing newly
established memories of the action sequences, or could have been due to viewing of the
test still frames simply directly triggering access to pre-existing semantic knowledge. In
order to test between these possibilities, in Experiment 2 participants viewed a randomly
organized set of still frames taken from each of the videos rather than the actual videos
themselves. This allowed for use of the same test stimuli from Experiment 1, with the
same targets and primes structured in an identical fashion. If activation of pre-existing
mental structures during the test phase can account for the goal priming advantage, then
this advantage should again be present when these £i-ames were viewed in the absence of
a coherent action context. However, if the results of Experiment 1 were due to memory
organization for newly encoded action, as I have hypothesized, then the results of this
experiment should yield no significant advantage for goal primes over temporal primes.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 94 adults, all students enrolled at the University of Oregon (46
female). Participants received partial course credit for their participation in the
experiment. One participant was excluded due to experimental error.
Stimuli
There were no video stimuli in this experiment. Instead, sets of still frames from
each of the videos were used in place of actual videos. These sets of still frames consisted
of the same targets, goal and temporal primes, and true and false fillers as in Experiment
1. In addition, four extra frames were taken from each video (two from each goal). These
additional frames were used only in the study phase for each set of still frames, in order
to make the study phases between Experiment 1 and 2 approximately equal in duration.
Design and Procedure
The design and procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except
for two key differences. First, sets of still frames were used in place of actual videos
during the study phase. These still frames were displayed one at a time for five seconds,
and the next still frame in the set was displayed immediately after. Impoliantly, the order
of still frame presentation within a set was entirely random. The second difference was
that participants no longer were asked to predict what the actor would do next, as there
was no temporal coherence during the still frame presentation to suppOli such a
prediction. Other than these two differences all aspects of the procedure were the same.
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Results
As in Experiment 1, only trials in which a participant correctly identified both the
target and the prime that preceded it were used to calculate mean target reaction times. In
addition, only data from participants who conectly identified 75% or more of the targets
(N = 75) was used in the analysis. This experiment was more challenging for participants
than Experiment 1, as the mean proportion correct was .86 (SD = .07), and this differed
significantly from Experiment 1 (M= .91, SD = .04), t(l68) = 6.12,p < .001. However,
paIiicipants in this experiment were also, on average, significantly faster at correctly
verifying previously seen still frames (M = 1094.86, SD = 291.18) compared to the
paIiicipants in Experiment 1 (M = 1290.82, SD = 315.64), t(l68) = 4.2l,p < .001.
Reaction times longer than 2.5 standard deviations above a participant's mean reaction
times were also omitted. Finally, as in Experiment 1, all means reported below are raw
reaction time means, while all within-subject statistical tests and effect sizes were
calculated using natural log transformed reaction time data.
In this experiment, no statistically significant difference emerged in participants'
target identification for goal primes (M = 964.82 ms, SD = 232.34) relative to temporal
primes (M = 989.49 ms, SD = 282.54), t(74) = 1.28,p = .20. In addition, there was no
statistically significant priming difference when comparing the proportion ofmisses for
targets primed by goal structure (M= .12, SD = .10) and temporal structure (M= .12, SD
= .10), t(74) = 0.48,p = .63.
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I also compared goal and temporal priming in an analysis treating targets as the
random factor. Mirroring the within-subjects analyses, there was no statistically
significant difference in reaction time for targets primed by goal information (M = 969.10
ms, SD = 113.64) compared to temporal information (M = 1002.09 ms, SD = 138.29),
t(31) = 1.37, P = .18. As well, no significant priming difference was observed in the
proportion of misses for goal-primed targets (M = .12, SD = .09) and temporal-primed
targets (M= .13, SD = .11), t(31) = O.22,p = .83.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 provide further support for the hypothesis that the
goal priming advantage seen in Experiment 1 was due to memory organization that
participants established as a result of viewing the action sequences. In this second
experiment, participants encountered action information regarding small action goals
(e.g., picking up shoes, opening the fridge) in a disorganized, pictorial fashion. This was
done so that I could test participants in the identical manner as in Experiment I (i.e.,
asking them to verify whether they had seen a given still frame previously), to examine
any priming effects on verification of target frames during the test in the absence of
having viewed the action sequences. At test, participants displayed no differences in
target detection based on the two prime types. Thus, goal primes functioned no
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differently than temporal primes in the absence of seeing the action, suggesting the
priming advantage for goal primes observed in Experiment 1 was not due to these primes
merely triggering pre-existing semantic memory.
Because participants were significantly faster at correctly identifying still frames
in this experiment compared to Experiment 1, one could argue that the absence of a goal-
priming effect in this experiment is due to a floor effect. However, since participants'
mean correct identification reaction time was approximately one second, this argument
holds little weight. Priming effects in a whole host of other cognitive domains can be
seen with reaction times that are much faster than the reaction times observed in this
experiment. It is unclear why participants were slower in Experiment 1 compared to this
experiment. One possibility is that in this experiment, participants were matching the
observed still frame in test to an exact physical still frame match in memory, while in
Experiment 1 they were matching an observed still frame to an actual event in memory.
Thus, the recognition test for participants in Experiment 1 involved determining whether
or not the current still frame described an event that could have occurred in the movie,
which would require additional processing time compared to simply matching the current
still frame to a previously seen still frame.
These results also provide additional evidence ruling out the idea that the goal
priming advantage observed in Experiment 1 was due to greater similarity between
targets and goal primes than targets and temporal primes. If similarity were the sole
source of this effect, it should have differentiated goal primes and temporal primes in the
same fashion in Experiment 2.
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Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrate that people
organize newly acquired action information in memory according to goals when they
view other people's behavior. However, the results of these experiments do not speak to
how this organization is actually accomplished. I hypothesize that visual action
information is directly translated into a form of semantic representation that highlights
the goals of the small action events and groups them together according to these goals
(potentially hierarchically). However, it is also possible that this process is achieved
linguistically. Perhaps as observers view complex action, they represent the action
sequence in the form of a nanative. Given that people are known to emphasize
propositional meaning over temporal structure in their organization of linguistic
information (text), then the nanative representation may be organized according to the
primary meaning of the action sequence - that is, the two goals. If the memory
representation is indeed a nanative, organized according to meaning, then the goal
priming advantage seen at test might be the same propositional priming advantage
already demonstrated by McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) in the text processing literature.
That is, the findings reported thus far might reflect memory representation derived from
nanative encoding, rather than organization of memory for action per se. Experiment 3
was designed to address this issue, investigating whether a goal priming advantage occurs
even when linguistic encoding - and hence nanative construction in the linguistic sense ~
is disrupted.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to explore the possibility that the memory
organization effects observed in Experiment 1 indicating an emphasis on goal encoding
might have been mediated by language. In this experiment, participants engaged in a task
very similar to Experiment 1, except while they were watching the videos they were
required to shadow spoken language. Shadowing is a technique in which participants
repeat aloud as quickly as possible language that is simultaneously being spoken over
headphones (Cherry, 1953). Shadowing has been shown to disrupt the ability to use
language to verbally recode visual information in simultaneous visual tasks (Besner,
Davies, & Daniels, 1981; W. K. Estes, 1973; Levy, 1971; Murray, 1967). In addition,
shadowing demands a large share of attention. Iflanguage is required to generate the goal
priming advantage seen in Experiment 1, then disrupting participants' ability to use
language during their viewing of the action sequences should seriously undercut this
effect. At test, participants should show no goal priming advantage iflinguistic recoding
was prevented during encoding. If, on the other hand, the goal priming advantage in
Experiment 1 arose directly from encoding of action information then the shadowing
task, disrupting linguistic recoding should not interfere with the emergence of this goal
priming advantage.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 86 adults, all students enrolled at University of Oregon (46
female). Participants received partial course credit for their participation in the
experiment.
Stimuli
The video and still frame stimuli were identical to Experiment 1. The shadowing
material was an audio recording of the children's story The Adventures ofPaddy the
Beaver (Burgess, 1917), narrated by a male voice. The story was 60 minutes and 56
seconds long (though participants did not hear the story in its entirety), and had a mean
sentence length of 16.49 words. The audio recording was played through a personal
digital audio player and headphones.
Design and Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, save for two key differences. First,
participants shadowed the children's story during the study phases of the experiment.
Participants controlled the playback of the story from the audio player. At the end of each
study phase, they were instructed to pause the audio player before starting the test phase,
and after each test phase, they were instructed to resume playback and shadowing. The
experimenter was in an adjoining room, and monitored whether or not participants were
shadowing the story appropriately (all participants were able to do so). The second
difference was that pmiicipants did not predict what the actor would do next, as I felt this
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would additionally increase the complexity of the task unnecessarily (given that it would
require participants to carry out two linguistic tasks simultaneously: shadowing and
predicting). Other than these two differences all other aspects were identical.
Results
Trials in which a participant correctly identified both the target and the prime that
preceded it were used to calculate mean target reaction times. Only data from participants
who correctly identified 75% or more of the targets (N = 77) was used in the analysis, in
order to ensure that mean target reaction times were reliable. This experiment was more
difficult than Experiment 1 in terms of the mean proportion correct (M = .84, SD = .06),
t(162) = 8.54,p < .001, but did not differ from Experiment 2 in this regard, t(177) = 1.42,
p =.15. As in the previous experiments, reaction times longer than 2.5 standard deviations
above a participant's mean reaction times were also omitted. As before, all reported
means are raw reaction time means, while all within-subject statistical tests and effect
sizes were calculated using natural log transformed reaction time data.
As predicted, even when shadowing rendered it difficult or impossible for
participants to linguistically recode the events, they identified targets primed by goal
information (M = 1113.17 ms, SD = 279.51) significantly faster than targets primed by
temporal information (M= 1147.59 ms, SD = 259.03), t(76) = 2.03,p = .046, Cohen's d
= 0.23. As in Experiment 1, this priming difference did not emerge when comparing the
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proportion of misses for goal-primed targets (M = .12, SD = .09) and temporal-primed
targets (M= .12, SD = .09), t(76) == 0.06,p = .95.
I again compared goal and temporal priming in an analysis treating targets as the
random factor. Complementing the above results, when a target was primed by goal
information (M = 1127.27 ms, SD = 173.29) it was identified faster than if primed by
temporal information (M = 1172.85 ms, SD = 188.12), and this difference approached
significance, t(31) = 1.94, P = .062, Cohen's d = 0.34. This priming difference was once
again not observed when comparing the proportion of misses for targets primed by goal
information (M = .12, SD = .14) versus temporal information (M = .12, SD = .11), t(31) =
0.14,p = .89.
Similarity Analyses
As in Experiment 1, I wanted to ensure that the goal priming advantage was not
due to goal primes being perceived as significantly more similar to targets compared to
temporal primes. Because this experiment differed from Experiment 1 due to the
shadowing procedure, it was possible that similarity could have played a more
meaningful role in any goal priming advantage that might have been observed. I thus
conducted the same correlation and similarity equivalence analyses for this experiment
that I conducted in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, the correlation between each
target's goal priming advantage (mean goal primed RT - mean temporal primed RT) and
each target's goal similarity advantage (mean goal similarity rating - mean temporal
similarity rating) was not significant, r(30) = .022, p = .90. I also correlated the difference
in pixel change (mean goal prime pixel change - mean temporal prime pixel change) with
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each target's goal priming advantage. Surprisingly this correlation was significant and
negative, r(30) = -.606, p < .001. In this analysis a positive correlation would have
indicated that perceptual similarity - in particular, goal primes being more similar to
targets - could have played a role in the goal priming advantage. The negative correlation
instead suggests that the bigger the goal prime changes were compared to temporal prime
changes the faster the target was verified. Although I cannot provide a sensible
explanation for this negative correlation, of greatest note is that the correlation was not
positive. Taken together these findings again argue against a strong role for similarity in
influencing participants' reaction times.
Following the analysis strategy of Experiment 1 further, I also conducted an
analysis in which certain targets were removed in order to equate the similarity of goal
primes and temporal primes (i.e., making the mean similarity difference statistically
equal). As in Experiment 1, when these targets were removed from participants' mean
target reaction times, the difference between targets primed by goal infonnation (M =
1109.70 ms, SD = 281.98) and temporal information (M= 1145.75 ms, SD = 244.24)
remained significant, t(76) ~~ 2.39,p = .019, Cohen's d= 0.27. In addition, when these
three targets were removed from the analysis treating targets as the random factor, the
priming advantage for goal information (M = 1118.00 ms, SD = 177.60) compared to
temporal information (M = 1163.62 ms, SD = 193.78) still approached significance, t(28)
= 1.76,p = .089, Cohen's d = 0.33. As before, the convergence between this analysis and
the correlational analyses indicates the observed differences in similarity between the two
prime types were unlikely to have been the sole source of the goal priming advantage.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 shed light on the possible mechanisms involved in
action memory organization. When participants shadow speech while they encode
complex action information, their memory for action nonetheless appears to emphasize
the goal structure of the action sequence. Thus, it appears that linguistic recoding is not
necessary for extracting goal infomlation from human intentional action sequences and
highlighting it in memory.
Recall that in Experiment 1, participants were asked to predict what the actor
would do next after viewing each action sequence. This was done to ensure that
participants processed the actions of the actors accurately. In this experiment, pmiicipants
were not asked to make this prediction, as I felt it would place too much additional
demand on the participant and interrupt the flow of shadowing during the study phase.
However, the results of this experiment suggest that making such predictions are not the
source of the goal organization effect. It is possible that making the predictions did
enhance participants overall memory for the events, as participants in this experiment
were significantly less accurate overall compared to the pmiicipants in Experiment 1.
However, most importantly, targets primed by goal information were still verified
significantly faster than targets primed by temporal information, suggesting that it is goal
inferences that primarily structure action memory.
The results of Experiment 3 are also especially striking given the large attentional
demands placed on participants in order to simultaneously shadow and watch the videos.
It is impressive that participants were able to process the action in meaningful, goal-
related terms while under this dual task demand. Taken together with the fact that
participants in this experiment did not predict the actor's next action, this suggests goal
organization in memory for action is robust and likely an important aspect ofpeople's
memory for action. As well, these findings suggest that memory organization in goal-
related terms may well occur fairly automatically.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 was designed to explore the organization of young children's
memory for human action. As I have demonstrated in the first three experiments, adults
primarily organize action memory according to inferred goals, even when goals are not
aligned temporally in the original event, and achieve this form of organization
sufficiently without the use oflanguage. Thus, Experiment 4 had three primary goals: 1)
to design a task that could assess memory organization in young children, 2) to explore
potential developmental differences in goal versus temporal organization between adults
and young children, and 3) to explore mechanisms that could potentially support the
development of goal organization.
With respect to the first goal, the basic memory priming task used with adults in
the previous three studies was modified to be more engaging for children. This involved
turning the task into something akin to a game, with prizes children could earn at certain
intervals throughout the game, a specially designed colorful response pad, and colorful
game titles and game music. My goal was to make the task interesting enough for
children so that they could complete as many trials as adults (in order to obtain stable
reaction times). Pilot testing with this modified task indicated that it was appropriate for
children of a minimum age of approximately six years. If this task were successful for
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observing reaction time differences in this population then it could be used to address a
variety of other developmental research questions in action processing that use priming as
the basic dependent measure. Priming studies have an advantage over studies that require
children to imitate previously seen action, as responses are not confounded with
inhibitory control. Though relatively rare, there have been a number of previous studies
that have successfully used priming tasks with children of this age (for recent examples
see Hashimoto, McGregor, & Graham, 2007; Mecklenbrauker, Hupbach, & Wippich,
2003). In the majority of these studies accuracy is used as the main dependent measure of
priming effects with young children, and priming effects manifested in reaction time are
rarer still.
Regarding the second goal, it was unknown how young children might organize
their action memory in comparison to adults. Previous research suggests two opposing
possibilities. The first is that children, like adults, will organize action memory primarily
according to inferred goals. This hypothesis is supported by Bauer's research on imitation
and enabling relations (Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Shore, 1987). Recall that enabling relations
denote a relationship between two or more actions in which one action must occur before
a second action can be performed. Bauer's research has demonstrated that when two
actions are linked by an enabling relation, children will recall these activities as having
occurred adjacent in time, even when an unrelated action intervened between these two
actions. To the degree that enabling relations provide a cue to goal inference, which
seems highly plausible, these results suggest that children reorganize action information
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in memory according to inferred goals, even when this process conflicts with the
veridical temporal structure of the sequence. If this is the correct interpretation, then
priming patterns in Experiment 4 should reflect goal over temporal organization.
On the other hand, a similar body of research suggests that temporal organization
might be the primary memory organization format in young children. The research of
Lyons et al. (2007) and Homer and Whiten (2005), and to a lesser extent Williamson and
Markman (2006), indicate that 3- to 4-year-old children are indeed sensitive to the
temporal structure of events for novel actions, at least when tested using imitation. When
children are presented relatively novel action events with novel objects, they are most
likely to imitate all steps in the sequence, regardless of enabling relations that may
structure the ultimate goal of the actor. Thus, if these results using explicit recall are
indicative of children's underlying memory organization, then the priming patterns in this
experiment should reflect the primacy of temporal over goal organization.
This discrepancy in which organizational format will be more primary in children
can be addressed with the third goal of this experiment, exploring potential mechanisms
that support the development of goal organization. I hypothesize that goal organization is
at times more primary than temporal organization in young children, and at times the
reverse is true, and that familiarity with the action events in question is one factor that
modulates which organizational format is more primary in memory. The effects of
familiarity likely interact with memory organization To the extent that young children are
familiar with an action scenario and thus readily able to infer the goals of the actor, then
memory for action should primarily be organized with respect to goal structure. However,
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when children cannot infer the goal of the actor, then memory cannot be structured with
respect to goals, and temporal organization should be more primary. This hypothesis is
similar to the explanation Williamson and Markman (2006) provided for their imitation
findings (though imitation of temporal order was not a central focus of their research).
In order to probe the role of familiarity in young children's memory organization,
I created a questionnaire - the Activity Survey - for parents to fill out which was
designed to assess how familiar each child was with the events depicted in the videos. My
aim was to correlate parental report of action familiarity with children's tendency to show
the goal priming effect. The video stimuli used in Experiment 4 were identical to the
stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 3. Although all of the events depicted in the videos
would have been highly familiar to adults, recall that half of the videos I designed to be
highly familiar to children and the other half to be relatively unfamiliar to children. I
hypothesized that priming patterns would reveal goal organization to a greater degree for
highly familiar events than for relatively unfamiliar events.
Method
Participants
Participants were 45 six-year-old children (M = 72.38 months, SD = 3.03, range =
66-77 months). There were 23 boys and 22 girls. Parents and their children were recruited
from the Eugene-Springfield area via phone, from a database of families maintained by
the University of Oregon Department of Psychology. Demographic characteristics of the
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families largely reflected those of the community from which they were recruited, which
is predominantly white and middle-class. A total of three participants were excluded from
the final analysis: one for only completing three blocks, one for misunderstanding the
task, and one due to experimental error. Families were compensated with a 10 dollar gift
certificate for a local toy store for their participation.
Materials and Stimuli
The video stimuli and still frame stimuli were identical to those used in
Experiments 1 and 3. For the practice phase of the experiment, eight animal illustrations
were also selected via an internet image search. These images included a cat, a butterfly,
a dog, an elephant, a goldfish, a horse, a ladybug, and a lion.
A special child response box was also created for this experiment. This box was a
cardboard computer keyboard box that housed a computer keyboard. The entire box was
painted yellow. Two holes, 6 cm in diameter, were cut out of the top of the box, centered
evenly along the surface of the box. Large wooden buttons, painted green and red, 4.7 cm
in diameter, were affixed to keys on the keyboard with poster tack. The buttons were
raised above the surface of the box with plastic cubes, and the gap between the hole in the
box and the buttons was filled in by red and green construction paper. Below each of the
buttons on the box Velcro signs were affixed that read 'Yes' and 'No'. The green button
was always paired with the Yes sign, and the red button with the No sign. The signs and
the buttons were removable so that the green Yes button would always be on the side of
the child's dominant hand (as determined from parent report).
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Activity Survey
An Activity Survey was created in order to assess children's familiarity with each
of the actions depicted in the video, through parent report. A copy of the entire survey
can be found in Appendix B. Each section of the Activity Survey was reserved for each
of the 31 actions depicted in the videos.2 Each section gave a short description of the
activity and asked questions within three different sub-sections: understanding,
frequency, and perfoffilance. In the understanding subsection, parents were asked to rate
how much they felt their child understood the steps involved in the activity on a 7-point
Likert scale, where 1 was Does not understand at all and 7 was Understands all steps
very well. In the instructions for the Activity survey, parents were informed to answer this
question specifically with regard to understanding the steps involved, and not with regard
to whether their child understood the overall purpose of the activity. Parents were also
given the opportunity to describe what aspects of the activity they thought their child
understood in this subsection as well. In the frequency subsection, parents were asked to
rate how often their child saw someone perfonn the activity on a 5-point Likert scale,
where 1 was Has never seen and 5 was Sees it nearly every day. Parents were also given
the opportunity to clarify this response below. Finally, in the performance subsection,
parents were asked whether their child could perform this activity themselves or with
help from someone else. They were also asked to rate how often their child performed
this activity.
2 Although each of the 16 videos contained two different activities, the activity Getting a bookfi"om the
bookshelfand reading/looking at it was used in two different videos, thus parents only reported on that
activity once in the survey.
63
Design and Procedure
The design of Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment I, with the same study
phases and test phases, separated into four blocks of four videos at a time. The
experimental procedure, however, differed in a number of respects. A script of the
experimental procedure can be found in Appendix C.
After parents gave consent, they were instructed to fill out the Activity Survey
while the child participated in the experiment. Children were then introduced to four
stuffed animals, and were told that each of the stuffed animals wanted to play The Movie
Game with the child. Children were then seated at a small table in front of the response
box and a small computer screen. They were then given a sticker sheet, which contained
four large boxes, each labeled with one of the four animal's names. Children were told
that every time they played The Movie Game with one of the animals, they would receive
a sticker from the animal at the end of the game. Children were told if they collected all
four stickers they would receive the prize, which was the ten dollar gift certificate for the
toy store.
Children were then introduced to the response box. They were told that the green
button was the Yes button, and the red button was the No button. In order to ensure that
the children understood the basic purpose of the response box, they practiced using the
response box to answer a set of yes and no questions asked by the experimenter. They
were then told they would practice using the box for a short memory game. Children
were first shown a series of four animal images on the computer screen, and were asked
to remember them all. Each image was displayed on the screen for a total of 5 seconds.
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Following familiarization, children were told that the screen would now show some
pictures, and that some of them would be pictures that they had just seen, and others
would be pictures they had not yet seen. Children were instructed to press the green Yes
key for old pictures and the red No key for new pictures. If children ever made a mistake
during this practice phase, the experimenter reminded them what the buttons were. A
total of four old and four new pictures were shown. Very few children made errors during
this phase, and those who did never made more than two errors.
Following the practice phase, children selected an animal to play The Movie
Game with. Once selected, The Movie Game title screen loaded and the title music
played, and children were told that the stuffed animal had 4 movies of its friends that it
wanted the child to watch. They were told that after they had watched all of the movies
(i.e., the study phase), they would playa memory game for the movies using the response
box (i.e., the test phase). With the exception of the test phase, the experimenter advanced
through the various pOl1ions of the game by clicking the mouse. Children were
introduced to the actor's name before each movie, and after watching each movie they
were asked to predict what they thought the actor would do next (verbally). Just as in
Experiment 1, this was done in order to ensure that children attended to the actions of the
actor during the video. Children also checked one of four boxes each time that they
viewed a movie in order to track their progress through the game.
At the end of the study phase, children began the memory game (test phase).
Children were told they would play the memory game for each movie they had seen.
They were told that for each movie pictures would show up on the screen, and some
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would be pictures of something the actor did in the movie, and that some would be
pictures of things that the actor did not do during the movie. They were instructed to
press the green Yes key if it was something the actor had done, and the red No key if it
was something the actor had not done. Just as in Experiment 1, still frames were
displayed one at a time and remained on the screen until the child responded, and a 150
millisecond blank screen separated each still frame presentation. If children made a
significant number of errors during the first memory game they were reminded how to
use the buttons, but most children did not need this reminder.
At the end ofTh~ Movie Game children selected a sticker for their sticker sheet,
and selected a new animal to play The Movie Game with. At the end of the entire study
they were given the ten dollar gift certificate. Parents were given an opportunity to ask
the experimenter clarification questions about the survey, and were then debriefed.
Results
Activity Survey
Mean ratings for the understanding subsection and the frequency subsection were
calculated directly from the Likert ratings provided by parents. Responses in the
performance subsection were coded numerically: responses indicating that a child could
not perform the activity were coded as 0, and responses indicating that the child could
perform the activity, with or without someone's help, were coded as a 1. Mean
performance scores for each activity were then calculated from these numerical ratings.
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Table 2. Correlations among subsections o.lthe ActiviZv Survey
Subsections
1. Understanding
2. Frequency
3. Perfonnance
* p < .001
2
.737*
3
.887*
.695*
As can be seen in the correlation matrix shown in Table 2, correlational analyses
indicated that all three subsections were significantly positively correlated with one
another. This suggested that the subsections were all measuring the same underlying
construct of familiarity. Thus, a composite familiarity score was created by calculating
the standardized average of each of these subsections (scores ranged from 0 to 1).
Mean composite familiarity ratings were calculated for each activity, and the
mean familiarity of each of the 16 videos was calculated from these mean activity
composite familiarity ratings. The resulting set of familiarity scores can be found in Table
3. Recall that I designed half ofthe videos to be highly familiar to children, and the other
half less familiar. The top eight familiar videos strongly matched my intuition, with the
exception of the Sweeping and Dishes and Running and Books videos, which I had
expected to be less familiar, and the Food and Cooking and Video Game and Drink
videos, which I had expected to be more familiar. Importantly, the group of unfamiliar
videos (M = .64, SD = .09) were significantly less familiar to children than the group of
familiar videos (M= .89, SD = .05), t(14) = 6.61,p < .001.
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Table 3. Meanfamiliarity scoresfor the 16 video scenarios, grouped asfamiliar and
unfamiliar.
Familiar Unfamiliar
Scenario Mean Scenario Mean
Familiarity Familiarity
Socks and toys .97 Food and cooking .79
Reading and eating .93 Video game and drink .76
Coloring and blocks .91 Tea and recipes .69
Combing and teeth .90 Ironing and folding .61
Running and books .87 Computer and cleaning .60
Cooking and cleaning .85 Filing and microwave .59
Sweeping and dishes .84 Windows and trunk .58
Train and toys .84 Frying and calling .52
Main Analyses
As in the first three experiments, only trials in which a participant correctly
identified both the target and the prime that preceded it were used to calculate mean
target reaction times. In addition, reaction times longer than 2.5 standard deviations
above a participant's mean reaction times were also omitted. Although I sought to
exclude participants who did not correctly identify 75% or more of the targets, as I did in
the first three experiments, the lower overall accuracy in this experiment would not
permit this, as it would have removed over half of the sample (N = 23). In fact, children
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(M = .80, SD = .07) were significantly less accurate than the adults in Experimentl (M =
.91, SD = .04), t(l18) = 10.53,p < .001. Children's accuracy scores were normally
distributed, however, and ranged from .65 to .95. Thus, reaction time data from all
participants was included in the analyses. It should also be noted that children's mean
reaction time for correct positive responses (M = 2589.10, SD = 427.87) was significantly
slower than the mean reaction time of adults in Experiment 1 (M = 1290.82, SD =
315.64), t(l18) = 18.61, p < .001. As in the previous experiments, all means reported
below are raw reaction time means, while all within-subject statistical tests and effect
sizes were calculated using natural log transfomled reaction time data.
Recall that, unlike with adults, I had no specific predictions regarding overall
priming differences for children. This is because I predicted that children might not be
familiar enough with at least half of the action scenarios to be able to emphasize goal
structure in their memory organization for the action content. Neveliheless, I explored the
reaction time data with respect to this overall difference. Although the mean difference
was in the same direction as the adults in Experiments 1 and 3, as predicted, no
statistically significant difference emerged in children's target identification for goal
primes (M = 2461.03 ms, SD = 462.97) relative to temporal primes (M = 2516.26 ms, SD
= 556.77), t(41) = 0.61, p = .54. In addition, there was no statistically significant priming
difference when the proportion of misses for targets primed by goal structure (M = .27,
SD = .13) and temporal structure (M = .27, SD = .17) were compared, t(41) = 0.12, p =
.91.
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I again also compared goal and temporal priming in an analysis treating targets as
the random factor. Consonant with the within-subjects analyses, and as predicted there
was no statistically significant difference in reaction time for targets primed by goal
information (M = 2509.28 ms, SD = 441.79) compared to temporal information (M =
2521.21 ms, SD = 425.24), t(31) = 0.13,p = .90. As well, no significant priming
difference was observed in the proportion of misses for goal-primed targets (M = .26, SD
= .20) and temporal-primed targets (M= .27, SD = .20) either, t(31) = O.17,p = .87.
Familiarity Analyses
I predicted that familiarity with the videos would interact with children's priming
differences in this experiment, and that priming patterns would indicate relatively more
goal organization for highly familiar videos than for relatively unfamiliar videos. From
the composite familiarity scores, videos were divided into the top eight familiar videos
versus the bottom eight unfamiliar videos (this grouping is represented in Table 3). I then
analyzed children's reaction times with a 2 (familiar vs. unfamiliar) x 2 (goal primed vs.
temporal primed) repeated-measures ANOVA. 3 Mean reaction times for each of the four
conditions in this analysis can be found in Figure 2. This analysis indicated no significant
main effects for either the type of prime, F(1 ,39) = 1.36, p = .25, or the level of
familiarity, F(1 ,39) = 0.17, p = .69. Most importantly, there was also no significant
interaction between the type of prime and the level of familiarity, F(1,39) = 1.07, p = .31.
Planned compmisons revealed there were no significant differences
3 Two children were excluded from this analysis as they missed all of the targets in one of the four
conditions, and thus there was no mean reaction time for that condition for these children.
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Figure 2. Mean reaction time to the target as a function of prime type (goal vs. temporal)
and action familimity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) when the familiarity grouping was based
upon average familiarity levels. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
between targets primed by goal information and temporal information for familiar videos,
t(39) = 0.52, p = .61 , or for unfamiliar videos, t(39) = 1.00, p = .32. Interestingly, though
non-significant, the mean differences for familiar and unfamiliar activities were actually
the reverse of what I predicted. At least for unfamiliar videos, ifthere is anything to be
gained from comparing mean differences alone, it looks as though goal organization is
more pnmary.
Results differed somewhat when accuracy served as the dependent variable in this
2 x 2 ANOVA. The mean error rates for each condition are displayed in Figure 3. In this
case, the main effect of familiarity was significant, F(1,39) = 5.18,p = .03, '12= .12.
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Figure 3. Mean target error rates as a function of prime type (goal vs. temporal) and
action familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) when the familiarity grouping was based upon
average familiarity levels. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
Children missed significantly fewer targets for familiar videos (M = .24, SD = .19)
compared to unfamiliar videos (M = .30, SD = .18). However, this analysis did not reveal
a significant main effect of prime type, F(l,39) = 0.21,p = .65, nor any significant
interaction between familiarity and prime type, F(l ,39) = 0.30, p = .58. As with the
reaction time data, planned compmisons revealed there were no significant differences in
accuracy between targets primed by goal infonnation and temporal infonnation for
familiar videos, t(39) = 0.68, P = .50 , or for unfamiliar videos, t(39) = 0.03, p = .98:
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I also ran analyses with targets as the random factor according to the average
familiarity level. The results of these analyses were identical to the previous analyses
with subjects as the random factor. For the reaction time data, there were no main effects
of familiarity, F(l ,30) = 1.03, p = .32, or prime type, F(l ,30) = 0.02, p =.90, and there
was no significant interaction between these two factors, F(l ,30) = 0.88, p = .36. For the
accuracy data, there were also no main effects of familiarity, F(l,30) = 0.83,p = .37, or
prime type, F(l,30) = 0.03,p = .87, and there was no significant interaction between
these two factors, F(l,30) = 0.57,p = .46.
Because data collected on the Activity Survey was for each individual activity, I
was also able to correlate data from the Activity Survey with the reaction time and
accuracy data of each individual target frame. A measure of the goal priming effect for
reaction time was created by subtracting the mean reaction time for each target in the
goal priming condition with the mean reaction time for each target in the temporal
pliming condition. The same calculation was applied to the mean error rates for each
target in each priming condition, creating a measure of the goal priming effect for error
rates. For both of these variables, higher scores indicate a stronger goal priming effect.
These two measures of the goal priming effect for each target activity were then
correlated with the mean values of each of the subsections of the Activity Survey for each
activity, as well as the mean composite familiarity score for each activity.
The correlation matrix for this analysis can be found in Table 4. As can be seen,
most of the correlations between these measures were non-significant. Surprisingly,
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Table 4. Correlations among measures ofgoal priming and measures offamiliarity
Measure Understanding Frequency Performance Familiarity
Goal Priming:
Reaction time
Goal Priming:
Error rate
* p = .051
-.182
.103
-.348*
-.076
-.235
.016
-.271
.014
however, yet consistent with the directionality of the effect with unfamiliar videos
reported above, the correlations between the goal priming effect in reaction time and the
measures of familiarity were all negative, and one correlation approached significance:
the con-elation between the average goal priming effect in reaction time and average
frequency that children saw the activity. Since this was a negative correlation, it indicated
that as children saw the activity more frequently they were less likely to show the goal
priming effect. This ran counter to my general hypothesis that as children became more
familiar with the activities they would be more likely to show the goal priming effect.
Again, however, this was only a marginally significant effect, and it was only with one of
the subsections of the Activity Survey. Nonetheless, it does match the mean difference
for unfamiliar videos primed by goal and temporal information observed in the previous
analysis with participants as the random factor.
Overall, at this point the data suggest that the predicted interaction between
familiarity and priming patterns was not present in this experiment. However, it was
possible that the familiarity grouping used in the above two analyses glossed over
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individual differences in relative familiarity across children. Perhaps the interaction
between familiarity and memory organization is present within an individual child, but
children's individual familiarity levels are so variable they wash out the interaction when
the familiarity grouping is created from average familiarity scores. In order to create a
more sensitive grouping of familiar and unfamiliar videos, I calculated a ranking of the
top eight familiar and lower eight unfamiliar videos for each individual child based on
parental report of familiarity for that child. Using this ranking, I calculated mean reaction
times and error rates for each type of prime at each level of familiarity.
Mean reaction times from this individual grouping were submitted to a 2 (familiar
vs. unfamiliar) x 2 (goal primed vs. temporal primed) repeated-measures ANOVA.4
Mean reaction times for each of the four conditions in this analysis can be found in
Figure 4. In this analysis there was no significant main effect of the type of prime,
F(l,36) = 0.03,p = .87, but the main effect of familiarity approached significance,
F(l ,36) = 3.36, p = .075, r/= .09. Somewhat surprisingly, targets from familiar videos (M
= 2590.74 ms, SD = 746.46) were verified significantly more slowly than targets from
unfamiliar videos (M= 2438.74 ms, SD = 805.15). However, there was again no
significant interaction between the type of prime and the level of familiarity, F(l ,36) =
1.37, p = .25. There was no significant difference between targets primed by goal
information and temporal information for familiar videos, t(36) = 1.05, p = .30 , or for
unfamiliar videos, t(36) = O.73,p = .47.
4 Five children were excluded from this analysis as they missed all of the targets in one of the four
conditions, and thus there was no mean reaction time for that condition for these children.
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Figure 4. Mean reaction time to the target as a function of prime type (goal vs. temporal)
and action familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) when the familiarity grouping was based
on individual familiarity levels. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
When accuracy served as the dependent variable in this 2 x 2 ANOYA, the results
mirrored the results of the average grouping analysis. The mean error rates for each
condition are displayed in Figure 5. The main effect of familiarity was again significant,
F(1 ,36) = 5.95, P = .02, r? = .14. Children missed significantly fewer targets for familiar
videos (M = .20, SD = .16) compared to unfamiliar videos (M = .28, SD = .21). Similarly,
this analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of prime type, F( 1,36) = 0.18, P =
.68, nor any significant interaction between familiarity and prime type, F(1 ,36) = 0.003, p
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Figure 5. Mean target error rates as a function of prime type (goal vs. temporal) and
action familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) when the familiarity grouping was based upon
individual familiarity levels. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
= .95. There was no significant difference in accuracy between targets primed by goal
information and temporal information for familiar videos, t(36) = 0.40, p = .69 , or for
unfamiliar videos, t(36) = 0.22,p = .83.
Discussion
Experiment 4 failed to reveal strong evidence that young children organize their
memory primarily in terms of either goal inferences or temporal structure. Although
children's mean reaction times to identifying the target were faster when primed by goal
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infOlmation compared to temporal infOlmation, this difference was not statistically
reliable. This failure to find a significant difference in overall priming patterns across the
16 videos is perhaps not surprising, given that the videos varied in the relative familiarity
of the actions depicted, and I hypothesized that familiarity would influence priming
patterns. Nonetheless, these results may indicate that by six years of age children show a
slight tendency to organize memory according to goal inferences, but this tendency is far
from the organizational preference that the previous experiments demonstrated in adults.
Although the adults in Experiments 1 and 3 showed no differences in accuracy at
correctly identifying the target across the two priming conditions, children might
plausibly nonetheless have displayed evidence of organizational preferences based on
accuracy rates. However, the overall accuracy rates for target detection did not differ
across the two priming conditions either.
The main predictions of this experiment concerned the role of familiarity in
memory organization. I predicted that goal organization would occur to a greater degree
for videos depicting actions that were highly familiar to children relative to videos
depicting less familiar actions. However, these predictions were also not borne out by the
data: there was no significant difference in reaction times based on the type of prime used
for familiar and unfamiliar videos in reaction time or in accuracy. It is worthwhile to
note, however, that the main effect of familiarity was significant in this experiment:
children were more accurate at detecting the target when it was a familiar video. This
provides evidence that the familiarity division I used ~ to split videos either into familiar
on unfamiliar ~ had some psychological reality in children's processing of the action
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scenarios. At the very least this demonstrates that the non-significant interaction between
familiarity and prime type was not the result of homogeneity in familiarity across the two
familiarity categories.
Interestingly, however, across both types of familiarity analyses - average video
familiarity and individual level familiarity - the pattem of mean reaction times actually
demonstrated tendencies opposite to those predicted. For familiar videos, targets primed
by goal information were detected about as quickly as those primed by temporal
information, but for unjclmiliar videos targets primed by goal information were generally
detected more quickly than those primed by temporal information. Very little can be
gained in the way of evidence from this observation alone, since this mean difference was
not statistically significant; It is thus unknown whether these tendency simply reflects
variation around a general mean reaction time or whether it instead reflects a tendency for
young children to organize memory according to goals for unfamiliar activities.
However, there was some additional evidence to corroborate this latter possibility: when
measures of familiarity were correlated with measures of the goal priming effect, there
was a trend for less frequently seen activities to show stronger goal priming effects (at
least in terms of reaction time). This was only a marginally significant correlation, and
the sample size of the correlation is low. Nonetheless, taken together with the mean
difference in the reaction time analysis with participants, this may indicate that children
are more likely to organize memory according to goals for activities that are relatively
unfamiliar.
79
In sum, the results of Experiment 4 failed to support predictions, but also
generated some puzzling unpredicted results. There are a number of reasons why this
may have been the case, but I will save discussion of these for the next chapter, the
general discussion.
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CHAPTER VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Despite the ubiquity of action processing in our daily lives, relatively little is
known about the cognitive system that supports such processing. The present studies are
among the first to investigate how memory for human intentional action is organized in
the mind, both in adults and young children. When we observe complex action in which
two goals are interwoven, we can plausibly represent the action in at least two contrastive
ways: with respect to the veridical temporal structure of the sequence, or with respect to
the goal structure of the sequence. The results from the current studies indicate that adults
emphasize goal information over temporal information in memory for human action.
When adult participants were required to remember whether a particular action was
carried out by the actor, priming on the preceding trial with goal-relevant information
significantly facilitated detection relative to priming with sequence-relevant temporal
information. Somewhat surprisingly, no evidence emerged that indicated 6-year-old
children emphasize goal information over temporal information in memory. Further,
familiarity with the actions involved did not influence young children's memory
organization.
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Because the results in adults and children differ, I will discuss the experimental
findings involving adults separately from those involving children. Following this, I will
end with some suggestions for future directions for this research.
Results with Adults
The results across the first three experiments with adults are consonant with larger
theoretical perspectives on how we process other people's behavior and social cognition
more broadly (Baldwin, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). When we observe other people move
about, our visual system is presented with a barrage of complex information from which
we need to extract meaning. A central aspect of this process is thought to involve
identifying the goals and intentions of the actor from movement patterns. In the majority
of cases goals are what observers seem to be interested in discerning, not specifics about
movement characteristics and trajectories. The present research has demonstrated that
goals are not only inferred from movement patterns, but also that such goal inferences
play an influential role in the way that action information is organized in the memory of
adults.
Interestingly, memory organization that emphasizes goal structure implies the use
of cognitive resources to infer and encode goals, which seems to require significant
processing in comparison to organization that emphasizes temporal structure.
Organization with respect to temporal relations comes for "free": participants only need
to store the information according to the order in which they receive it. Organization via
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goal structure requires making an inference about the actor's goals and intentions, and-
at least for the stimuli used in these experiments - also requires some form of
reorganization in memory. What is more, these results suggest that adult participants
expend this additional cognitive effort to achieve goal organization spontaneously,
without explicit instruction to do so. At this point I can only speculate as to why this
process occurs spontaneously. These findings are reminiscent of research demonstrating
that attending to meaning during encoding promotes subsequent recall (Craik & Tulving,
1975; Elias & Perfetti, 1973). Thus one possibility is that goal-related information is
advantaged over temporal information simply for reasons of meaningfulness more
generally. Another possibility, however, is that this organizational tendency might be
especially beneficial, cognitively speaking, when disfluencies occur within the motion
stream - that is, when goal-related action is intelTUpted by incidental behavior or action
that serves unrelated goals. The frequency with which such disfluency occurs in everyday
action is unknown, but it seems likely to be common. Thus, later recall of such action
may be improved with goal organization.
Although some of the conceptual inspiration for this research came from prior
work on memory for text, these results do not simply reflect the identical priming effects
that have been reported in the text processing literature. First, the results of Experiment 3
suggest that language is not the medium by which goal information is extracted from the
action scenarios. Second, the current task differed in a number of ways from the research
of McKoon and Ratcliff (1980). For one, the verification task was visual as opposed to
linguistic. Relatedly, in the test phase of McKoon and Ratcliffs study, participants were
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verifying whether the ideas expressed in propositions were true or false given the text
they had previously read, but none ofthe propositions were word-for-word veridical
sentences that were read in the original text. Thus, it is possible that McKoon and
Ratcliffs test biased participants toward a meaning-based strategy in their recognition of
the text material. In these experiments participants were all tested with images that they
actually had seen in the videos they had just watched. It is thus striking that goal primes
facilitated target frame recognition relative to temporal primes, given that the temporal
primes indeed occurred in closer proximity to target frames in participants' prior
perceptual experience.
Language and Action
While acknowledging the differences just discussed, at the same time the results
with adults are strikingly similar to the findings of McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) on
memory for text, from which I adapted my basic research methodology. In both domains,
memory for complex infOlmation is organized in a fashion which differs from how it was
originally structured. It is important to note, however, that the analogy is not perfect. The
meaning hierarchy that McKoon and Ratcliff proposed for memory for text is not a
partonomic hierarchy, as seems to be the case for action processing (Zacks, Tversky, et
aI., 2001). Moreover, the propositions contained in the passages McKoon and Ratcliff
used were likely more complex in their arguments and connectedness than the semantic
infOlmation extracted from the action sequences in the present research. Nonetheless, the
present findings point to intriguing commonalities in the encoding of meaningful
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structure across language and action. The extent to which such commonalities arise as a
direct result of domain general mechanisms guiding processing across domains will be an
interesting topic for future research.
Although memory for language and action seem to share important
commonalities, these findings also indicate that the process of goal organization in
memory need not be mediated by language. When adult participants were required to
shadow speech while watching the videos, their memory for action nonetheless
emphasized goal structure. The resulting memory is likely some kind of semantic
representation, but a form of semantic representation that is non-linguistic. It is yet
unknown how this process is achieved, which is yet another issue ripe for investigation.
Temporal Infotmation
Again, it should be emphasized that these findings in no way point to temporal
information being left out of adult's memory representations of action. These results
clarify that adult memory for action emphasizes goal relations relative to temporal
relations, at least for action sequences like those that were sampled. Information about
the veridical sequential structure of the events could well be stored, but simply not as
strongly. In fact, recent research on statistical learning of action sequences suggests that
observers exploit sequential temporal information for the purposes of discoveling higher-
level units within continuous novel action that they can already segment at a small-scale
level (e.g., Baldwin et aI., 2008; Swallow & Zacks, 2008). Thus, for the purposes of
segmentation, processing temporal information is key. Temporal relations among actions
could also potentially be a cue to goal inference. For example, if you observe someone
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sniff the contents of a cup and then take a sip from it, you might assume they found the
contents agreeable and took a drink. However, if they took a sip from the cup and then
sniffed the contents afterward, you might assume they found the contents disagreeable
and may not drink it again.
Indeed, temporal information may playa relatively important role in memory
when action is strikingly novel, even for adults. In the present research, extracting the
goal structure was likely relatively easy, as the videos depicted goals that adult
participants were, on the whole, very familiar with. However, when extracting goal
infoTI11ation is difficult, as may be the case when action is quite novel, people may
register temporal information more heavily and emphasize it in the organization of action
memory. In such cases, temporal information may become more prominent in online
processing, and consequently gain ascendance in memory organization.
While novelty may challenge the action processing system and alter processing
and/or memory tendencies, individual differences might also playa role in the
organization of action information in memory. For instance, individuals with autism, who
have been shown to have difficulty inferring the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen,
1995; Gernsbacher, Stevensen, Khandaka, & Goldsmith, 2008), may have difficulty
extracting the goals from action and organizing their memory with respect to such goals.
Their action memory may emphasize temporal relations to a higher degree than nonnal
individuals. In a similar vein, individuals with schizophrenia may also emphasize
temporal relations, as their ability to detect intentions in theory of mind tasks has been
shown to be disrupted (Frith & Corcoran, 1996).
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Broader Implications
While the results of the present experiments have direct implications for the field
of action processing and event cognition, they also have implications for a variety of
other domains.
Recall that participants in these studies viewed videos in which actions related to
different goals were intermingled in the actual motion stream. Their reaction times to
verify target still frames revealed that they had gleaned a goal structure that abstracted
beyond the temporal flow of events. Accounting for human action processing will thus
need to include a characterization of the mechanisms by which such inferential
redescription occurs. This is one criterion by which to evaluate the success of theoretical
accounts and computational models of human action processing (Flieschman et aI.,
2006). Interestingly, one influential account of a mechanism enabling people to extract
intentions and goals from others' action - the Motor Cognition Hypothesis (MCH),
which points to the involvement of the mirror neuron system (Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, &
Sinigaglia, 2009) - falls short of explaining such redescription. The crux of the MCH is
that minor neurons directly represent the abstract intention of all simple motor behaviors
that observers can execute themselves, which is thought to result in direct understanding
of action events without requiring sophisticated metarepresentational capabilities such as
inferences about mental states. On this account, intentions are apprehended directly from
the flow of behavior as small actions sequentially unfold across time. Yet the current
findings clarify that observers achieve, and encode, an analysis of the goal structure that
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goes beyond direct apprehension ofsmall-scale action intentions from the surface flow of
motion. At present, the MCH provides no way of accounting for this higher-level analysis
of goal structure.
Another perspective on the present research is that it showcases a new
methodology for indexing inferences about intentions and goals that observers have made
upon viewing dynamic action. Such a methodology is potentially valuable for exploring
the presence of intentional inferences. This possibility is of particular interest in relation
to populations such as infants and non-human primates, as there is debate regarding
whether, and when, genuine intentional inferences are executed (Gergely, Nadasdy,
Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Povinelli, 2001; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003; Woodward et aI.,
2001). Interestingly, infants and non-human primates unable to infer goal structure might
display better memory for surface temporal properties of action than those who are able
to achieve the higher-level analysis of goal structure. A shift in priming patterns away
from surface temporal advantage to goal-structure advantage would thus provide an
additional index complementing existing techniques for probing such understanding in
these populations.
Results with Children
The results of Experiment 4 with children were not as clear cut as the set of
results with adults. When looking at the overall priming patterns, children's mean
reaction times to target detection in the two priming conditions were in the same direction
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as adults. However, because ofthe large variability in children's reaction times, this
difference was not statistically significant, and thus the directionality of this difference
cannot be relied upon as systematic. More critical to the predictions of Experiment 4
were children's reaction times to unfamiliar and familiar videos in the two priming
conditions. Variability again overshadowed mean differences in this analysis, and
similarly no significant differences in priming patterns between the two levels of
familiarity were found.
The remaining discussion is split into three sections. The first two will focus on
two potential reasons children may have failed to show any reaction time differences in
this task, namely 1) that young children do not yet have any organizational preference in
memory for human action, and 2) that the task used was problematic. I will then discuss
the role of familiarity in children's memory organization.
The Lack of an Organizational Preference in Young Children
Recall that the main hypothesis for the experiment with children was that
familiarity would increase the degree of goal organization in memory. Note that this
hypothesis is not specific to children. It is entirely possible that familiarity with the
activities that comprise the achievement of a goal could influence memory organization
at any age. Children were assessed in order to test the effect of familiarity simply because
they are less familiar with activities in comparison with adults. Using children allowed
me to generate a set of video stimuli that I could be reasonably assured adults would be
familiar with, but that would vary in familiarity for children. If familiarity with the
activities modulates children's response times to detecting the target, then analyzing
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responses based solely upon goal versus temporal priming could lead to a null result.
According to this view, children may at times organize primarily according to inferred
goals, but at other times organize primarily according to temporal structure, and it is
children's relative familiarity with the activities that can, at least in part, explain this
variation. Since I designed the videos in order for there to be differences in the relative
familiarity to children of the activities depicted, I effectively reduced the number of
videos that could demonstrate an overall effect of goal over temporal priming. Thus, this
aspect of the design may have reduced power for observing any overall organizational
differences in young children.
Assuming, however, that familiarity does not contribute to children's memory
organization, a second possibility is that the overall null results for goal and temporal
priming indicates a genuine difference between adults and young children in the
organization of action memory. Although somewhat puzzling, it is possible that young
children do not yet organize memory preferentially according to goals, as adults appear
to. I say puzzling because there is now a great deal of research suggesting that many
aspects of action and goal understanding are present very early in infancy (Baldwin et aI.,
2001; Gergely et aI., 1995; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005; Woodward, 2009). This
body of developmental research suggests a great deal of continuity in the action
processing system from infancy to adulthood. Thus, to some extent the possibility that
young children differ from adults in their action memory organization would be
surprising, given the early emergence of many action processing skills. However, the
issue of how memory for action is represented and organized in the mind has received a
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great deal less attention to date. In particular, this dissertation reports the first research
that specifically addresses how action memory is organized for sequences of action in
which goal and temporal information do not coincide perfectly. Thus, the difference
between adults and young children may in fact be the result of a relatively late-emerging
component of the action processing system.
An intriguing possibility is that these results may be showcasing some kind of
organizational equivalence in young children's memory representations of human action.
This organizational equivalence could be due to the fact that children do not yet organize
primarily according to one type of information over the other. According to this view,
children extract goal information and temporal structure, and both types of information
influence the organization of the memory structure to such a degree that neither type is
primary over the other. Thus, in this experiment, goal information would have primed the
target just as well as temporal infoTI11ation, and the difference that was obtained in
reaction time according to the two plime types was simply an estimate of zero difference.
While the possibility that young children differ in their memory organization from
adults is intriguing, it is impossible to argue from a single set of null results. If further
research confirms that the type of prime has no effect on children's response times and
that familiarity does not interact with the type of prime on children's response times, then
this would provide support for the hypothesis that children genuinely differ from adults in
their memory organization for human action.
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Problems with the Methodology
Even if further research can replicate these null results, there would remain the
possibility that the priming methodology itself is deficient in accurately revealing young
children's memory organization. According to this view, these results simply reflect a
failure to find a significant difference in children that was found with adults.
There are at least two ways in which the task itself may have been problematic.
First, it may simply be that reaction times are too variable in 6-year-old children, and thus
reaction time was not an ideal choice for the main dependent measure with this age
group. To be sure, some researchers have successfully utilized reaction time as a
dependent measure to explore cognitive processing in young children. Estes (1998), for
instance, has shown differences in reaction time in mental rotation tasks with 5-year-old
children (see also Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, & Goldknopf, 1990). Although children's
reaction times are much slower than adults, studies like these indicate that systematic
variation in response times do exist for certain types of cognitive processing. However,
the effects Estes showed for mental rotation in 5-year-olds were on the order of one
second. Recall that the priming effect in adults observed in Experiments 1 and 3, while
statistically reliable, was nonetheless small. Children may indeed organize memory for
action according to goal or temporal information, but the small reaction time difference
that would provide evidence of organizational preferences from priming patterns would
be washed out amidst their highly variable reaction times.
The second problem with the task is the large attentional demand it placed on
children. Although children enjoyed the task generally, they may not have been as
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attentive as adults while watching the videos. Children appeared to enjoy the overall
structure of the task, and almost all children seemed to really enjoy the test phases; some
children even verbally volunteered their liking of that phase of the experiment. However,
for all of the children it was at times difficult to maintain attention on the videos during
the study phase. Some children would talk through the videos, while others would simply
let their eyes wander around the room. Although the experimenters vigilantly monitored
children's attention to the screen during the study phases, and consistently brought
children's attention back to the screen if it wandered, the attentional demands of the task
were high, and may have been too high for children at this age. This may have had a great
impact on their memory for the studies.
Indeed, children's overall accuracy was significantly lower than adults' in
Experiment 1. Children had more trouble correctly identifying true still frames and
correctly rejecting false still frames, which led to a decrease in the number of correctly
identified targets. Recall that in the experiments with adults I set a strict criterion that
75% of the targets be conectly identified in order for a participant's data to be included.
Because the data with children was not held to this criterion, this may have had a
negative impact on the reliability of the mean reaction time estimates.
The Role of Familiarity
Although I predicted that familiarity would increase the likelihood that memory
for action would be organized according to goals, the interaction between familiarity and
the type ofprime was not significant, and the mean differences according to familiarity
were actually opposite to predictions. As I have already discussed, there are a number of
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reasons why this null effect does not necessarily imply a lack of association between
familiarity and memory organization. For one, the methodological problems outlined in
the previous section also apply to this analysis as well: children's variable reaction times
may have clouded any small differences. Furthermore, inattention to the videos may have
decreased children's memory, and this may have introduced error into the data.
It may also be that the familiarity contrast somehow missed the mark. Perhaps the
parent report measure I designed - the Activity Survey - was not valid, and thus was not
sensitive enough to children's actual familiarity levels with the activities in the videos. A
careful examination of this possibility would require correlating the Activity Survey with
some other measure of children's familiarity levels. In some ways, however, the present
dissertation has already done this. Recall that children were less accurate at correctly
identifying the target for unfamiliar videos than for familiar videos. Thus, at least at a
very global level, the results of the Activity Survey do correlate with children's memory
abilities.
Nonetheless the contrast may not have been as sharp as it could have been.
Although I split videos into those that were highly familiar and those that were less
familiar, the majority of children were familiar with the nature of the activities to some
extent (at least in terms of the overall purpose of many of the activities). Especially since
all videos were split into familiar or unfamiliar, there was a high degree of similarity in
familiarity scores fro111 videos at the bottom end of the familiar group and the top half of
the unfamiliar group. One possible analysis that would have alleviated this concern to
some extent would have been to create a group of the top five familiar and the bottom
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five unfamiliar videos, and so removing videos the six videos that were of 'medium'
familiarity. However, this analysis was not possible with the current sample, as mean
reaction time estimates would, in many cases, have been based 'on too few reaction times.
In order to avoid this issue in a future study, ideally one would create videos that would
be novel for all children, and compare memory organization for those videos to videos
that are highly familiar to the majority of children.
While I can conclude very little about the role of familiarity in action memory
organization from the results with children, speculating about possible differences
according to the pattern of findings may be relevant to future research in this domain. In
particular, I believe the fact that unfamiliar videos showed a mean advantage for goal
priming over temporal priming is potentially of interest. One speculation is that when
young children view unfamiliar activities, their inferential system may actually be hard at
work attempting to infer the goals of the actor from his or her behavior. The activation of
the inferential system while inferring goals for relatively unfamiliar activities may be
increased relative to the activation required to infer goals for familiar activities. This
increased activation may help to promote goals in memory, and thus goal information is
more readily available to serve as the primary means of organization in the memory trace
for relatively unfamiliar activities. Perhaps the familiar videos used in this experiment
were too familiar to children, and strong goal organization only occurs in young children
when goal inferences require more cognitive processing.
In any case, the key difference between the organization of memory for familiar
activities and unfamiliar activities may have been modulated by some difference in the
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amount of cognitive processing that children were engaging in while watching the videos.
Children may have been paying attention more globally to the unfamiliar videos, or
engaging more heavily in inferential processes for unfamiliar videos because they were at
the right level of unfamiliarity. Unfortunately, this dissertation cannot address the
veracity of these speculations. At this phase I am offering what is simply speculation
based on a set of null results. Future research can explore what actually influences young
children's action memory organization.
Limitations and Future Directions
This dissertation has uncovered a heretofore unknown property of action
processing: at least in adults, action memory appears to be structured according to
inferred goals, and is even reorganized to conform to inferred goals when the goal
structure of the action sequence does not map perfectly on to the temporal flow of
observed events. This discovery, however, is only the tip of the iceberg in understanding
the cognitive system that processes other people's behavior and generates memory
representations of human action events.
One limitation of the current research was the use of familiar activities. When
familiar activities with familiar objects are used, there exists a risk that any effects of goal
priming could be due to similarities between the goal prime and the target in the objects
used, or could be the result of pre-existing associations in memory for the actions
involved in the activities. I anticipated this result, and took several measures to alleviate
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this concern: 1) I collected data on the subjective similarity between primes and targets,
and investigated possible relations between those similarity ratings and the effect of goal
priming in Experiments 1 and 3, 2) I collected data on the objective perceptual similarity
between primes and targets, and explored possible relations between those similarity
ratings and the effect of goal priming in Experiments 1 and 3, and 3) I ran a control
experiment (Experiment 2) in which the effect of goal priming was observed when
participants viewed frames that had been extracted from the action videos but in random
order during the familiarization phase (yielding exposure to the test frames without
coherent structure). Findings that emerged from all three of these countermeasures
pointed to the same conclusion, suggesting that the effect of goal priming was the result
of newly created associations in memory for the action events, and was not due to
similarity or pre-existing memory associations.
Nonetheless, one could still dispute the adequacy of these countermeasures for
laying this concern to rest. Since goal primes were rated as subjectively more similar to
targets compared to temporal primes, one could argue that the effect of similarity still
exerted influence over the reaction time data in a more global fashion, without
necessarily being revealed in a correlational analysis across items. In addition, one could
argue that the results of the control experiment were simply a result of a Type II error.
Since the direction of the means in that experiment showed that targets were identified
more quickly ifprimed by a goal prime, it could be that the effect really was there, and
was simply not observed due to statistical variation in the size of the mean difference.
After all, the goal priming effect observed in Experiments 1 and 3 was also small.
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In order to alleviate these concerns completely, one would need to create action
events that were novel in some way. This could be achieved by filming events involving
novel objects with novel functions, or by filming events in which familiar objects are
used in novel ways. In the former case, the events would have no basis for previous
memory associations, and one could more carefully design the objects and events such
that perceptual similarity was reduced between the goal primes and the targets. In the
latter case, previous memory associations could not be a systematic confound, as the way
in which the objects and events manifested in the videos would differ from previous
associations. Designing a study that utilizes one of these two principles will be an
important direction for future research in this domain, in order to be certain that the
observed goal priming effect in adults is due solely to the organization of newly formed
action memories.
Another direction for future research in this domain is the degree to which goal
and temporal information are maintained in memory over time. In the text processing
literature, it has been shown that memory for the surface features of text decays over time
while memory for the meaning of propositions in the text does not show this same decay
(Fillenbaum, 1966; Sachs, 1967). Depending on the degree of similarity in memory
processing between text and action, there might be a similar process of surface decay
over time. Temporal information in action is one form of surface memory, and thus one
might expect the advantage of goal priming relative to temporal priming to increase over
time. This would be a relatively easy study to carry out, as one would only need to
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introduce a delay between study and test for one group of pmiicipants, and compare these
findings to the results from a separate group who had no delay between study and test, as
was done in the experiments described.
With children, the direction of future research should be focused on determining
whether or not this effect of goal organization over temporal organization can be
observed. The first three experiments of this dissertation identified this principle of action
memory organization in adults, so it must emerge at some point in development.
Since it is unclear whether priming effects in reaction time can even be observed
in young children, designing a task that does not involve reaction times as the main
dependent measure would be ideal. One possibility - that would require the same type of
video stimuli used in the current research - would be to design a task in which children
explicitly judge the order of events in the action sequences. For example, children could
be shown a target event, and then shown two other action events, one that is from the
same goal as the target but occurred farther away in time (goal event), and another that is
from a different goal that occurred closer in time to the target (temporal event). Children
could be asked to judge which event occurred before/after the target event. If children
organize action according to inferred goals, then they may be more likely to incorrectly
judge that the goal event occurred closer in time to the target instead of the temporal
event. It is possible that in a context such as this, the effects of goal organization could be
observed in young children.
The future directions previously outlined with adults could also apply to future
research with children. Since the effect of familiarity on memory organization is as yet
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unclear from the results of this dissertation, comparing children's memory organization
for familiar versus novel actions could be of great interest. Introducing a delay between
study and test for children could also be valuable, as one could compare whether children
differ in the degree to which goal and temporal information is maintained in memory
over time, compared with adults.
Conclusion
This dissertation deepens our understanding of action processing. Organization in
memory for action in adults emphasizes the goal structure that is extracted from the
action events, and this is undertaken spontaneously, without explicit instruction, and
without mediation from language. Young children did not reveal any tendency to
organize action memory according to goal or temporal structure, whether the videos were
highly familiar or relatively less familiar. Thus, the organization of action memory in
young children and the process by which children's memory for action transforms into
the mature adult memory system remain topics for future research. Nonetheless, this
dissertation has uncovered a heretofore unknown aspect of the cognitive system that
processes action, and opens the door to future research on action memory and its
development.
APPENDIX A
DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF THE VIDEO STIMULI
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1. Coloring and blocks
Setting: In a room with a small desk
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Open block container
Take out some blocks
Close lid of box and push aside
Attach blocks together
Move block figure aside
Get sheet of paper from the shelf
Grab crayon box from shelf
Get out crayon A fi'om box
Draw with crayon A on paper
Put crayon down
Move paper aside
Get block figure
Get more blocks out of container
Attach more blocks on to figure
Move container and figure aside
Put back crayon A
Get out crayon B
Draw with crayon on paper B
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
2. Cooking and cleaning
Setting: In a kitchen
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Grab colander
Open cupboard A
Put colander in cupboard A
Grab vinegar
Put vinegar in cupboard A
Grab bag ofbread
Take out two slices of bread
Open mustard container
Grab butter knife
Get mustard out with knife
Spread mustard on bread with knife
Close cupboard A
Grab rice
Open cupboard B
Put rice in cupboard B
Grab flour
Put flour in cupboard B
Close cupboard B
Grab sliced cheese
Unwrap sliced cheese
Put cheese slices on sandwich
Grab slice of meat
Put meat on sandwich
Put sandwich together
Target 1
Goal prime 2
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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3. Combing and teeth
Setting: In a bathroom
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Open cabinet
Grab toothpaste
Close cabinet
Unscrew toothpaste cap
Put toothpaste down
Grab comb
Comb hair
Put comb down
Grab toothpaste
Grab toothbrush
Tum away from sink
Put toothpaste on brush
Put toothpaste down
Put toothbrush in mouth
Open cupboard
Grab hair elastic
Close cupboard
Put hair in ponytail
Brush teeth
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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4. Computer and cleaning
Setting: In a horne office
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Grab and stack paper
Put papers on floor
Open desk drawer
Grab calculator
Put calculator in drawer
Close desk drawer
Unzip backpack
Pull computer out of backpack
Place on computer stand
Grab pens
Put pen into pen holder
Grab glass and bowl
Move glass and bowl to one side of desk
Wipe table with hand
Get out and unwrap power cord
Plug in power cord to computer
Plug in power cord to power outlet
Plug in cables to computer
Open up laptop
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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5. Filing and microwave
Setting: In an office with a filing cabinet
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Grab and stack papers
Open drawer of filing cabinet
Take folder lout of drawer
Open folder and place on desk
Put papers into folder 1
Close folder 1 and move aside
Grab plastic bag
Get box of food out of bag
Open box of food
Remove food package
Place food package near microwave
Grab folder 1
Put folder 1 back in drawer
Get folder 2 out of drawer
Open folder 2
Grab and stack more papers
Put papers in folder 2
Close folder 2
Open microwave door
Put food package into microwave
Close microwave door
Press buttons on microwave
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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6. Food and cooking
Setting: In a kitchen
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Open fridge
Grab pasta sauce
Put pasta sauce on counter
Grab cheese
Put cheese on counter Target 1
Close fridge
Open cabinet A
Get out pot and close cabinet A Temporal prime 1
Fill pot with water
Place pot on stove Goal plime 2
Tum on stove
Open fridge
Grab juice
Put juice on counter
Grab salad dressing
Inspect label of salad dressing Goal prime 1
Put salad dressing on counter
Close fridge Temporal prime 2
Open cabinet B
Get noodle container out and close cabinet B Target 2
Open lid to noodle container
Put noodles into pot
Close lid to noodle container and put on counter
Grab spoon
Stir contents of pot
105
7. Frying and calling
Setting: In a kitchen
Actor gender: Fema]e
Events:
Open cabinet
Get out frying pan from cabinet
Place frying pan on counter
Open fhdge
Grab egg container
Place egg container on counter
Open drawer
Get phone book out of drawer
Place phone book on table
Open phone book
Look up number
Pick up phone
Dial number and listen
Hang up phone and put down
Get out egg from container
Put pan on stove
Crack egg on pan
Empty egg into pan
Place egg shell in container
Look up number again
Dial number and listen again
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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8. Ironing and folding
Setting: In a living room with a laundry basket
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Open closet door
Get out ironing board
Close closet door
Set up ironing board Target 1
Grab laundry basket
Take lid off of laundry basket
Pick up towel A Temporal prime 1
Fold towel A
Put towel A on couch
Pick up towel B
Fold towel B
Put towel B on top of towel A Goal prime 2
Get out shirt
Put shirt on ironing board
Open closet door Goal prime 1
Get out iron
Close closet door
Put iron on ironing board Temporal prime 2
Pick up towel C
Fold towel C Target 2
Put towel C on top of towel B
Pick up towels and walk out of room
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9. Reading and eating
Setting: In a room with a table and bookshelves
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Scan bookshelf
Select book
Put book on table Target 1
Pull out chair
Sit down in chair
Open plastic bag
Get banana bunch out of bag Temporal prime 1
Take banana from bunch
Put banana bunch back in bag Goal prime 2
Peel part of banana
Open book and place on knee
Flip through pages Goal prime 1
Put book back on table
Read pages from book Temporal prime 2
Take bite from banana
Peel banana again Target 2
Take second bite from banana
Look around room
Take third bite from banana
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10. Running and books
Setting: In a room with a bookshelf
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Grab shoes
Untie shoes
Put shoes down on floor
Pick up book A
Take book A to shelf
Shelve book A
Sit down on chair
Pick up shoe I
Put on shoe I
Tie shoe I
Pick up shoe 2
Put on shoe 2
Tie shoe 2
Pick up books Band C
Take books to shelf
Shelve books Band C
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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11. Socks and toys
Setting: In a room with a dollhouse
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Grab doll box
Take off lid of doll box
Get out doll A
Get out doll B
Put doll box on shelf
Grab lid
Put lid on doll box
Sit on couch
Grab folded socks
Unfold socks
Put socks down
Open doll box again
Get out doll C
Put back doll B
Put lid back on doll box
Grab dolls
Put dolls in dollhouse
Grab socks
Put on sock 1
Grab sock 2
Put on sock 2
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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12. Sweeping and dishes
Setting: In a kitchen
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Open closet door
Get broom
Close closet door
Sweep floor Target 1
Lay broom against counter
Get cutlery Temporal prime 1
Open drawer
Put cutlery into drawer Goal prime 2
Close drawer
Open closet door Goal prime 1
Grab dustpan
Close door
Sweep dirt into dustpan
Open garbage cabinet door
Throwaway dirt into garbage Temporal prime 2
Close garbage cabinet door
Attach dustpan to broom and lean against door
Open cupboard Target 2
Get cups
Put cups into cupboard
Close cupboard
111
13. Tea and recipes
Setting: In a kitchen with a bookshelf
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Grab kettle
Place kettle on burner
Open cupboard
Get out tea cup
Close cupboard
Grab recipe book
Open book
Place book on counter
Flip to a page
Scan page
Turn on burner
Open cupboard
Get tea packet from cupboard
Close cupboard
Open tea packet
Put tea bag into tea cup
Pick up book
Flip to new page
Read new page
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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14. Train and toys
Setting: In a room with a toy cabinet
Actor gender: Female
Events:
Pick up toy box
Open cupboard A
Put toy box in cupboard A
Close cupboard A
Pick up toy car and puppet
Open cupboard B
Put toy car and puppet in cupboard B
Close cupboard B
Get train set box
Get train tracks out of box
Set up train tracks on floor
Put blocks in box
Put block box on top of cupboard
Get out trains from train set box
Put trains on to train tracks
Set up more tracks on floor
Push trains along track
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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15. Video game and drink
Setting: In a living room with a TV cabinet
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Get video game system
Put game system on floor
Open cabinet
Get out game controller
Close cabinet
Plug controller into game system
Get game box
Put game box on floor
Grab soda can
Grab glass
Put glass on floor
Open soda can
Open game box
Take out disc
Put in disc in game system
Close game box
Put away game box
Pour soda into glass
Put can down
Take sip of drink
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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16. Windows and trunk
Setting: In a driveway with a parked car
Actor gender: Male
Events:
Get spray bottle and rag
Open driver side door
Spray inside window
Wipe inside window
Spray outside window
Wipe outside window
Close driver side door
Put bottle and rag on roof of car
Open trunk
Shuffle items in trunk
Grab bag A
Put bag A in trunk
Open rear side door
Grab bottle and rag from roof
Spray inside window
Wipe inside window
Spray outside window
Wipe outside window
Put rag and bottle on roof
Grab bag B and bag C
Close rear side door
Shuffle items in trunk
Put in bag B
Put in bag C
Close trunk
Target 1
Temporal prime 1
Goal prime 2
Goal prime 1
Temporal prime 2
Target 2
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APPENDIX B
ACTIVITY SURVEY
Activity Survey
We are interested in finding out how much your child knows about different activities. A
very short description of an activity will be provided and a number of questions about
that activity will follow. Please answer the questions using the scales as well as with
written comments. Please do not feel obligated to comment using the written portions if
there is no clarification needed.
The first question for each activity asks how well you think your child understands the
steps involved in this activity. This question is not directly asking about your child's
understanding of the purpose of the activity - e.g., that containers are for storage, or that
microwaves heat up food. A child could know the purpose behind the activity but still not
know the steps involved in carrying out that activity. Please do your best to just indicate
your child's understanding ofthe steps involved in the activity.
If you have questions or need clarification about a particular activity, please note the
page, and then move on to another question. The researcher will be happy to provide help
on that question once you have completed the rest of the survey. Our goal is to help you
provide the best infOlmation you can about your child's level of understanding about
these activities.
Thank you for filling out this survey!
1. Using crayons to draw a picture
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
. evelY day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
2. Building something with duplos/legos
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 5 6 7
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
3. Getting toys out of a container to play with
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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I 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
I
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
4. Unfolding and putting on socks
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
I 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 5 6 7
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
5. Brushing teeth (from getting the toothbrush to brushing)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 5 6 7
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
6. Combing/brushing hair and putting it in a ponytail
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects ofthis activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? Ifthey do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
7. Peeling and eating a banana
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
8. Getting a book from the bookshelf and reading/looking at it
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
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9. Setting up toy train tracks and playing with a train on them
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
10. Cleaning up toys (putting them in containers and putting containers on shelf/in
cupboard)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
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11. Playing a video game (getting out a video game and system, and setting up game
and controllers)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
unders tands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your ch~d ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
12. Opening up a canned drink, pouring it into a cup, and drinking it
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
13. Cooking pasta (or something similar that requires boiling water)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
14. Getting food out of the fridge
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
15. Cleaning up the kitchen (putting food and utensils into cupboards/drawers)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
I
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
16. Making a sandwich
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
I 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
I
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
17. Putting on and tying up shoes
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? Ifthey do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
18. Putting books away on a bookshelf
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 5 6 7
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects ofthis activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
19. Heating food in a microwave
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
126
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
20. Putting papers in a folder and filing them in a filing cabinet
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
21. Ironing clothes (setting up the ironing board and ironing a shirt)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
22. Folding laundry
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
23. Sweeping the floor
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
24. Putting away dishes (from a dish strainer to the cupboard)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
25. Making tea (putting a kettle on and putting a tea bag in a cup)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
26. Using a frying pan to fry eggs
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
I 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
27. Getting out the phonebook and making a phone call
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
28. Tidying up a desk (clearing off junk and putting things in drawers)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
29. Setting up a laptop computer (opening it up and plugging in cords)
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
30. Cleaning car windows
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 567
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
31. Packing luggage in a car trunk
a. How much do you think your child understands the steps involved in this
activity?
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1 2
does not
understand at all
3 4 5 6 7
understands
all steps very well
Please specify what aspects of this activity you think your child understands:
b. How often does your child see you or someone else do this activity?
1
has never
seen
2
has seen
once or twice
3
sees it every
now and then
4
sees it nearly
every week
5
sees it nearly
every day
Please comment about this if you feel you need to clarify:
c. Does your child ever do this activity? If they do this with your or someone
else's help, please specify. Also specify how often they do this activity.
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APPENDIX C
SCRIPT USED WITH CHILDREN IN EXPERIMENT 4
Introduction
Introduce animals:
o "This is Busy Beaver, Diggity Dog, Tiny Turtle and Funky Monkey. They
all heard you were coming in to play today, and are really excited to play
the Movie Game with you. Do you want to play the game with them?"
Introduce sticker sheet:
o "OK, so we'll play the game with each ofthem one at a time. And here is
your sticker sheet! Each time you play the movie game with one of them,
they'll give you a sticker for your sticker sheet. When you have filled up
all 4 stickers on your sheet, you'll get the prize. And do you know what
the prize is? 10 dollars for the toy store!"
Familiarize children with answer box:
o "OK, this is the answer box. This GREEN button is the YES button, and
this RED button is the NO button. We're going to use the answer box in
our game, but first we need to practice using it. I'm going to ask you some
questions, and I want you to answer them using the answer box. You press
the green button for YES, and the red button for NO. Are you ready?"
o Questions: "Do fish swim?" (YES), "Do dogs meow?" (NO), "Do you
wear socks on your ears?" (NO), "Do you wear shoes on your feet?"
(YES)
o "OK! Now let's practice using the screen. I'm going to show you some
pictures up on the screen, and I just want you to try to remember them."
o <do practice study phase with animal pictures>
o "Now for the memory game. Some pictures are going to show up on the
screen, and some are going to be pictures you just saw, and some are
going to be pictures you didn't see. If it's a picture you saw, you press the
green button for YES. Ifit's a picture you didn't see, you press the red
button for NO. OK?"
o <do practice test trial>
o "OK, are you ready to play? Who do you want to play with first?"
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Structure of each block (four total)
Introduce the study phase:
o "[Animal] wants to play the Movie Game with you. [Animal] has four
movies of his friends that he wants to show you. After you watch each
movie, we'll check the box here to say we've watched it. After we watch
all of the movies, there will be a fun memory game to play using the
answer box. And after the memory game, he'll give you a sticker for your
sheet!"
o "OK -let's start with [actor]'s movie. Watch it carefully, because you'll
need to remember what happened to play the memory game at the end."
o After watching a movie:
• "OK! Great job! It's all done. Hey [child's name], what do you
think [actor] was going to do after that?"
• "Alright, let's check the box for that movie on your sheet."
After all four movies in the study phase:
o "OK, now for the memory game. We're going to play the memory game
for [actor]'s movie first. Some pictures will come up on the screen. Some
of the pictures are things [actor] did in the movie, and some are things
[actor] didn't do in the movie. If the picture is something she did in the
movie, you press the green button for YES. If it's something she didn't do,
press the red button for NO. OK? Are you ready to play?"
o After first test (and remind as necessary after later tests):
• "Good job! Now we'll play the memory game for [actor]'s movie.
Remember, press the green button if it' s something [actor] did do,
and the red button ifit's something [actor] didn't do. OK, you
ready?"
o After all four tests:
• "OK! You did so good! You got through all of the movies! For
helping him play, [animal] wants to give you a sticker. Let's bring
your sheet over to the sticker table to get a sticker."
• "Now another friend wants to play the movie game with you. Who
do you want to play with next?"
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